? This is the list of TLDs affected:
[snip]
int.(international orgs - important)
Matters related to int. are discussed in RFC 9121. It's a good idea
to get some data. It's not a good idea to take a decision by fiat on
matters directly related treaty-based organizations.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
information in the draft about those various forms of attacks. Is
that like someone the audience (of the draft) is expected to know
after reading the eight RFCs which are referenced by the draft? :-)
Appendix C has a reference to draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1
instead of this draft.
Regards,
S
those recommendations.
The IETF angle is that there is a Standards Track memo which
specified what to do when special handling of a DNS label is required.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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ll-written. It probably needs some work
before it is ready for a Last Call. I suggest consideration what to
do about RFC 5933 given that the intended status of the document.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
1. The Security Area Directors will likely ask whether the document
was reviewed by the relevan
policies for the DNS Root Zone?
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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it stalled in DNSOP. There is also a 2018 draft (expired). I
vaguely recall looking at a draft. However, proposed changes were
not accepted.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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RFCs [1][2] as "Informational".
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
1. https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4431
2. https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5074
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". I suggest taking into
consideration that RFC 1035 is part of STD 13 for errata processing.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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is the IPR issue?
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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Hi John,
At 10:43 21-05-2014, John Levine wrote:
See RFC 1123, section 5.2.2.
Tony Finch already commented about RFC 1123. That section has been
replaced (see RFC 5321). Section 8.7 of RFC 6409 is applicable for
mail submission and CNAME.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
.
What does the above have to do with Security Considerations? How
many of the DNSSEC-related outages are due to human error?
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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. It is worthwhile to consider whether the mechanism should be
standardized by the IETF.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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Hi Ted,
At 04:56 16-05-2014, Ted Lemon wrote:
Did you feel that your comments were adequately addressed by the
working group?
I gave up on reading the first response to my comments as I did not
want to push back strongly; it's an effort and it can be viewed as
antagonistic.
Regards,
S
to NIST SP 800-78. That document is about
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity
Verification. Is that the NIST recommendation on which this
discussion is based?
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
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if that will
happen given the track record, but that is the roadmap.
Thanks for the above information. Adding to it, 1024-bit RSA keys
are allowed until 2015. There is an explanation about that
recommendation, i.e. it's not only about packet size.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
the outcome of the Rollover consultation.
Regards,
S. Moonesamy
1. To date, despite huge efforts, no one has broken a regular
1024-bit key; in fact, the best completed attack is estimated to be
the equivalent of a 700-bit key. An attacker breaking a 1024-bit
signing key would need to expend
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