So SEARS is a method of replacing the DNS roots with a well-known
service portal providing a Google or other SE based access model. The
session can interface with traditional HTTP or DNS-Lookup Ports to
deliver content or addresses to a browser in the form of a HTTP redirection.
The protocol
to be amended to
support copyright disclosure for the records responded and that this is
key to global copyright protection.
In the interim we think a COPYRIGHT USE STATEMENT published as a TEXT
type record may work for systems which use legacy packages to operate.
Todd Glassey
the statistical likelihood of an
accidental collision - its the potential for an engineered one and one
in a trillion is too many possible problems.
Todd Glassey
-Ekr
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No virus
.
If you can proof one, you can also proof the other :)
Not so - and its prove. The issue is that technical proofs and legal
proofs are NOT the same thing anywhere but here before the IETF making
them worthless in Courts.
Todd Glassey
I think they both only provide
proof of non-existence
there IMHO
Todd Glassey
-Ekr
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No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 8.5.432 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/2637 - Release Date: 01/21/10
On 1/21/2010 12:12 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 11:38 AM, Paul Hoffmanpaul.hoff...@vpnc.org wrote:
At 2:17 PM -0500 1/21/10, Edward Lewis wrote:
At 11:05 -0800 1/21/10, Eric Rescorla wrote:
I still don't understand why this implies the need for regular
three years in the future that the
resolutions done today actually happened and were done correctly.
From my point of view this isnt about just working right in the present
its about working right in creating enduring evidence of that operation.
Todd Glassey
In that circumstance,
Paul
to be reviewed as part of any formal IT audit practice as well.
Todd Glassey (as an Auditor).
Doug
No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 8.5.421 / Virus Database: 270.14.7/2421
these technologies would also perform functions in the real world
which would have legal implications and so the ability to represent
trust-anchor processes in the records created would admissible in global
courts. This nomenclature provides a resource for this and other uses.
Todd Glassey
attachment
presidential order
(especially a HSPD) or just a simple presidential directive can shut all
- repeat ALL - of ARIN's and each of the root systems down since the US
DoC still owns them.
I wonder how many of the Internet-Mavens on this list have figured that
out...
Todd Glassey
On Wed, 2 Sep 2009
have been more accurate than anyone wanted.
Todd Glassey
On Thu, 3 Sep 2009, Todd Glassey wrote:
Dean Anderson wrote:
BTW, RFC2870 is not the authority on root server operations. The
authority is found in the MoU with ICANN that root server operators are
supposed to sign. Rumor has
Since the Internet is formally listed as a component of US Critical
Infrastructure - I want to know the specific provisioning requirements
for operating a root server. Anyone got a pointer to these?
Todd Glassey
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Joe Abley wrote:
On 25-Aug-2009, at 12:48, Todd Glassey wrote:
If there *is* a practical motivation to roll keys, then let's not
infer any trust at all from old keys.
I agree that if a KEY is rolled it needs to have its application as a
reliable TRUST ANCHOR revoked or terminated for events
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 9:55 AM -0400 7/13/09, Livingood, Jason wrote:
On the topic of 'lying resolvers' though, that seems a bit strong IMHO. But perhaps I have missed a strong MUST statement (per RFC 2119) in a relevant RFC that you could refer me to?
I am not aware of an RFC that
Daniel Senie wrote:
On Apr 14, 2009, at 2:54 AM, Douglas Otis wrote:
On Apr 13, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
If a application is doing the wrong thing w.r.t. SRV records then
fix the application. The root servers can handle a Aand
queries for .. Most cache's will
Daniel Senie wrote:
On Apr 14, 2009, at 3:25 PM, Todd Glassey wrote:
Daniel Senie wrote:
On Apr 14, 2009, at 2:54 AM, Douglas Otis wrote:
On Apr 13, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
If a application is doing the wrong thing w.r.t. SRV records then
fix the application. The root
Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
On Wed, Mar 04, 2009 at 03:13:57PM +0100,
Stephane Bortzmeyer bortzme...@nic.fr wrote
a message of 27 lines which said:
For instance, should the ABNF allow fully-numeric top-level domain
names? There is no *technical* reason to ban them.
Wow, I never
, but in a cyber-context. Content which is anchored is
made portable, that is comparable to any other content processed through
a child or like process.
Sorry...
Todd Glassey
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