1. the users considerations pretend that users must use onion-aware
software in order to access Onionspace, but I assert that you and I can
use an ordinary Web browser, type in a .onion address, and access the
requested service. Not only OnionTLD conflicts with P2PNames on that
point, it also
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On 05/12/2015 03:12 AM, Alec Muffett wrote:
... both Firefox...
One of them - the Tor Browser - is using a SOCKS daemon which knows
that “.onion” is special and shouldn’t be looked up in the public DNS.
*** So in my understanding of the scope
On May 12, 2015, at 7:44 AM, hellekin helle...@gnu.org wrote:
*** So in my understanding of the scope boundaries of RFC6761 IANA
considerations, which seems to be the main difference between our drafts
and our respective positions, the former is an application, while the
latter bundles an
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 2:29 AM, hellekin helle...@gnu.org wrote:
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On 05/11/2015 08:21 PM, Alec Muffett wrote:
This might be an issue so long as your threat model includes blindly
unaware users who are typing .onion addresses into
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On 05/12/2015 04:18 AM, Alec Muffett wrote:
On May 12, 2015, at 7:44 AM, hellekin helle...@gnu.org wrote:
*** So in my understanding of the scope boundaries of RFC6761 IANA
considerations, which seems to be the main difference between our
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 06:12:54AM +, Alec Muffett wrote:
I believe that this demonstrates the condition you were looking for?
Yes, and it's exactly the model I had in mind, and it also
demonstrates that users do in fact need to use different software in
order to access onion. Moreover, it
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 09:06:44AM -0300, hellekin wrote:
Let's see. Naked firefox is one case. The TBB is another. SSH is
yet another. All three match the application case. But only the TBB
comes with a built-in Tor resolver (and matches the name resolution API
or library case.) Do you
On 12 May 2015 at 07:23, Andrew Sullivan a...@anvilwalrusden.com wrote:
If the Tor Browser has its own resolver that is used just by it and
that is not a separate service installed with the expectation that
other clients will use it, then it seems to me the built-in Tor
resolver is part of the
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 9:34 AM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote:
On 12 May 2015 at 07:23, Andrew Sullivan a...@anvilwalrusden.com wrote:
If the Tor Browser has its own resolver that is used just by it and
that is not a separate service installed with the expectation that
other clients
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On 05/12/2015 09:23 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
Is your complaint that appelbaum-dnsop-onion reads to you as though
such special applications are the only way to do this? If so, then
you're right that it needs adjustment.
*** Yes, my concern
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 9:17 AM, hellekin helle...@gnu.org wrote:
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On 05/12/2015 09:23 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
Is your complaint that appelbaum-dnsop-onion reads to you as though
such special applications are the only way to do this? If
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Since Alec Muffett seems to have better things to do, I feel obligated
to do what he should have done before publishing his draft: comparing
the IANA Considerations for .onion in the
draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names-04 (P2PNames) and
Hi there,
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 06:15:47PM -0300, hellekin wrote:
draft-appelbaum-dnsop-onion-tld-01 came as way to fast-track the
processing of .onion special-use TLD, as the P2PNames draft was
considered too controversial (and maybe too complicated?).
As one of the people who has
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 7:21 PM, Alec Muffett al...@fb.com wrote:
Hi Hellekin!
Since Alec Muffett seems to have better things to do
I'm sorry if you've been waiting for my input - I am not the primary
author of the document; Jacob Appelbaum's name is in the document's
title for a good
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On 05/11/2015 08:21 PM, Alec Muffett wrote:
This might be an issue so long as your threat model includes blindly
unaware users who are typing .onion addresses into non-Tor-capable
browsers in the (presumably first-time) expectation that it will
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 09:29:02PM -0300, hellekin wrote:
*** How can you fail to see that P2PNames says Users can use these
names as they would other domain names, while OnionTLD says they cannot
?
I think people can see that, and they disagree with you.
If you put an onion name into an
Hi Hellekin!
Since Alec Muffett seems to have better things to do
I'm sorry if you've been waiting for my input - I am not the primary
author of the document; Jacob Appelbaum's name is in the document's
title for a good reason, and my involvement has been one of tuning a
few paragraphs,
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