Re: [DNSOP] HSTS on receiving a signed HTTPS record (was: Questions / concerns with draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https ...)

2022-09-07 Thread Ben Schwartz
I believe the proposed change here is moot. The point of the current "MUST NOT" is just a reminder that this logic does not require doing anything unsafe. A DNSSEC signature on the HTTPS record would not enable any substantial improvements to the pseudo-HSTS upgrade. Also, HTTP specifications ge

Re: [DNSOP] HSTS on receiving a signed HTTPS record (was: Questions / concerns with draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https ...)

2022-08-31 Thread Brian Dickson
On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 10:43 AM Eric Orth wrote: > I'm not sure what exactly is being changed or clarified with this > suggestion. Section 9.5 already applies at SHOULD-level, whether > cryptographically protected or not and whether the received records were > AliasMode or ServiceMode. > The t

[DNSOP] HSTS on receiving a signed HTTPS record (was: Questions / concerns with draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https ...)

2022-08-31 Thread Martin Thomson
On Wed, Aug 31, 2022, at 18:39, Brian Dickson wrote: > One additional suggested addition to the end of section 3.1 is: >>If DNS responses are cryptographically protected, and at least >>one HTTPS AliasMode record has been received successfully, >>clients MAY apply Section 9.5 (HSTS equi