And the MR was peer-review and merged into BIND master branch with intent to
backport the feature into older release branches.
I don’t think it’s a useful or helpful to change the rules for existing adopted
work. We need to have a discussion on the mechanisms that would allow
implementors to know when to start the implementation of existing draft. From
implementors point, it makes little sense to start implementing before the
protocol change is almost fully baked (aka WGLC and further), because until
then the protocol might change considerably.
So, if we require implementation report further down the road, it needs to be
more clearly defined than people suddenly shouting “this is not ready” when
WGLC starts. And while the attempt to implement something is certainly useful
to get valuable feedback, it also imposes some costs (with undefined limit) on
implementors (especially the open source implementors) and it sort of discards
the whole “Proposed Standard” -> “Internet Standard” classification at global
IETF level.
I get that we probably need something more lightweight than “Internet Standard”
at the WG level, but this needs to be discussed and consensus reached.
ISC gave our feedback during the implementation and here are some nits from me
(re-reading the document again):
~~~
Section "2. Protocol Walkthrough Example" will be made into Appendix at
publication time, so just reminder here that you also need to change the
references like "(see the logic below)” when you move the section - perhaps add
direct reference to the other section this refers to?
~~~
The table in 3.2 says:
"Key Tag is trusted” and “Key Tag is not trusted” - it seems little bit
confusing to me; I think that “Key is trusted” and “Key is not trusted”; or
some change similar to this needs to be made:
“First, the resolver determines if the Key Tag is trusted by comparing
numerical value of <key-tag>
to any of the Key Tags of an active root zone KSK which is
currently trusted…"
in paragraph just before the table you mix “Key Tag” and “keytag” and there’s
also <key-tag>…
My understanding of the text and the proposed fix:
[…]
First, the resolver determines if the numerical value of <key-tag> is
equal to any of the Key Tags of an active root zone KSK which is
currently trusted by the local resolver and is stored in its store of
trusted keys. If a match is found the <key-tag> is trusted. An active
root zone KSK is one which could currently be used for
validation (that is, a key that is not in either the AddPend or
Revoked state as described in [RFC5011]).
Second, the resolver alters the response being sent to the original
query based on both the left-most label and the presence of a key
with given Key Tag in the trust anchor store. Two labels and two
possible states of the <key-tag> generate four possible combinations
summarized in the table:
Label | <key-tag> is trusted | <key-tag> is not trusted
------------------------------------------------------------------
is-ta | return original answer | return SERVFAIL
not-ta | return SERVFAIL | return original answer
[…]
~~~
o A query name that is signed with a DNSSEC signature that cannot be
validated (such as if the corresponding RRset is not signed with a
valid RRSIG record).
This is called “Bogus” by RFC 4033 Section 5 -> maybe a reference?
~~~
In Section: 7. Privacy Considerations
s/mechansim/mechanism/
~~~
That is all folks.
Cheers,
Ondrej
--
Ondřej Surý
ond...@isc.org
> On 7 Apr 2018, at 08:27, Evan Hunt <e...@isc.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 06, 2018 at 10:09:50PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
>> I think I heard that ISC was considering adding support, but was
>> planning on waiting till RFC / some sort of LC.
>
> Yes. The work in progress is available here:
> https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/merge_requests/123
>
> --
> Evan Hunt -- e...@isc.org
> Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
>
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