On Thu, Nov 09, 2006 at 03:59:13PM +0200,
Pekka Savola [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
a message of 18 lines which said:
Yes, I saw that, but I believe whether it's the main concern or not
is irrelevant -- the question to ask should be, is this variation
of attack relevant to the scope of the
On Mon, Nov 13, 2006 at 10:15:07PM -0800, Douglas Otis wrote:
domain. His issue only distracts from the SPF concern. Any remedy to
resolve an NS chaining exploit raised by William, if there is an
exploit, is completely orthogonal to the problem raised by the SPF
script.
Well, maybe. I'm
On Mon, Nov 13, 2006 at 10:15:07PM -0800, Douglas Otis wrote:
There is a general threat to DNS created by an experimental email script
contained within DNS records.
As far as I understand, the attack vector relies on some process
outside the DNS retrieving, interpreting and acting on records
...'s presentation last week...
(I'm being sarcastic about being scared of Doug, btw. But it gives a
good title.)
The issues of SPF, DKIM, other SPAM prevention technics and in
general slapped-on security approaches is not a topic for this list.
If and when I refer to a case, it's for
In [EMAIL PROTECTED] Douglas Otis [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The SPF script language does not improve data compression. APL RR
(RFC3123) provides 10 times the informational density and existed prior
to SPF development.
*sigh*
Where do you get this 10 times claim from?
To represent an IPv4
[I'll not be answering Doug directly. Mainly because if I start doing
it, we'll continue forever as Doug would never stop (his arguments
would still be same and not clear) and result is likely that most
folks would locally blacklist both of us...]
On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, Edward Lewis wrote:
What I find potentially troubling is that an application might choose to refer
to the DNS in an unwise way to find ancillary data to verify that a received
message unit is genuine and is authorized to be processed.
(Un)fortunately, the DNS is the best
At 20:27 +0100 11/14/06, Paul Wouters wrote:
On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, Edward Lewis wrote:
The third ingredient is the amplification factor that is a result of
robustness of the security. When slapping security onto any
existing system,
some level of robustness is lost.
and gained?
No,
