Re: [Dnssec-deployment] domain outage incident - redirected email attempts thwarted by DNSSEC

2015-09-29 Thread Mukund Sivaraman
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 10:59:15AM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > So, my emails to this person were not delivered to the rogue MX servers > because both he and I deployed DNSSEC. +1 Another similar example: gimp.org expired in the second week of August and entered the grace period. At this time,

Re: [Dnssec-deployment] grace period (was Re: domain outage incident - redirected email attempts thwarted by DNSSEC)

2015-09-29 Thread Mukund Sivaraman
Hi Andrew On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 11:27:48AM -0400, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 08:41:05PM +0530, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: > > directed DNS to their nameserver and was serving records (how is the > > registrar permitted to control the domain except disabling it, when it > > is

Re: [Dnssec-deployment] domain outage incident - redirected email attempts thwarted by DNSSEC

2015-09-29 Thread Dave Lawrence
Paul Wouters writes: > However, they did not modify the DS records after taking over the NS > records and MX/A records. Sadly though, they could have.

Re: [Dnssec-deployment] grace period (was Re: domain outage incident - redirected email attempts thwarted by DNSSEC)

2015-09-29 Thread Andrew Sullivan
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 09:02:04PM +0530, Mukund Sivaraman wrote: > What I had asked above was: except disabling it (i.e., > disrupting/denying access), how is the registrar permitted to control > the domain (redirecting to their NS to serve A records, which is > nefarious)? It's not nefarious.