On Wed, 2 Nov 2022 08:42:15 -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
> indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
> pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
> ROP attacks. If they ar
On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 03:03:05PM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 08:42:15AM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> > With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
> > indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
> > poi
Hi all,
On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 08:42:15AM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
> indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
> pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
> ROP att
On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 08:42:15AM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
> indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
> pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
> ROP attacks. If
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG),
indirect call targets are validated against the expected function
pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate
ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time,
which manifests as
