Hi, Dave.
Dave Airlie wrote:
AllowInsecureDRI is less secure than forcing users to run things as root
or fix the code. And we want that code in kernel and causing pain in
order to make people fix it 8)
I'm really with Keiths don't let them do anything until someone fixes
Thomas Hellström wrote:
Also, the people on the unichrome site including me are totally lost
when it comes to 3D, and you'll need
a quite detailed documentation to fix things up. I guess the 3D command
verification will be
quite some work. The best would be to convince VIA that they would very
Hi, Ian!
Ian Romanick wrote:
Thomas Hellström wrote:
Also, the people on the unichrome site including me are totally lost
when it comes to 3D, and you'll need
a quite detailed documentation to fix things up. I guess the 3D
command verification will be
quite some work. The best would be to
On Maw, 2004-10-12 at 01:14, Dave Airlie wrote:
application so it could modify them after validation if it was sufficently
sneaky enough... for the mach64 the idea was to allocate a pool of private
buffers using pci interfaces and use those to pass command streams after
verification.. the user
Thomas Hellström wrote:
Hi!
Sorry for the double posting. This is a thing that needs to be discussed
in both communities.
The via DRM has started it's journey into the linus kernel, but the 3D
driver / DDX still suffers
from a security flaw:
When the MMIO area is exported read-write it is
Hi, Keith!
Thomas Hellström wrote:
Hi!
Sorry for the double posting. This is a thing that needs to be discussed
in both communities.
The via DRM has started it's journey into the linus kernel, but the 3D
driver / DDX still suffers
from a security flaw:
When the MMIO area is exported
Thomas Hellström wrote:
Hi, Keith!
Thomas Hellström wrote:
Hi!
Sorry for the double posting. This is a thing that needs to be discussed
in both communities.
The via DRM has started it's journey into the linus kernel, but the 3D
driver / DDX still suffers
from a security flaw:
When the MMIO area
On Llu, 2004-10-11 at 09:42, Thomas Hellstrm wrote:
So what is your actual suggestion?
Export read-write as default or, as proposed, export read-write when
AllowInsecureDRI is enabled in the X server config?
AllowInsecureDRI is less secure than forcing users to run things as root
or fix the
AllowInsecureDRI is less secure than forcing users to run things as root
or fix the code. And we want that code in kernel and causing pain in
order to make people fix it 8)
I'm really with Keiths don't let them do anything until someone fixes it
.. makes life easier.. I don't think having in
