On Wed, 6 Jan 2010, Brandeburg, Jesse wrote:
a counter patch, without atomic ops, since we are protected by napi when
modifying this variable.
Originally From: Neil Horman nhor...@tuxdriver.com
Modified by: Jesse Brandeburg jesse.brandeb...@intel.com
original message
Hey all-
A
On Tue, Jan 12, 2010 at 05:56:28PM -0800, Brandeburg, Jesse wrote:
On Wed, 6 Jan 2010, Brandeburg, Jesse wrote:
a counter patch, without atomic ops, since we are protected by napi when
modifying this variable.
Originally From: Neil Horman nhor...@tuxdriver.com
Modified by: Jesse
On Tue, 12 Jan 2010, Neil Horman wrote:
I'm sorry, it doesn't clear much up, at least not for me. The patch you're
referencing above deals only with the jumbo receive path, not the non-jumbo
case, which is not written to handle skb chains. The vulnerability targets
the
latter case
a counter patch, without atomic ops, since we are protected by napi when
modifying this variable.
Originally From: Neil Horman nhor...@tuxdriver.com
Modified by: Jesse Brandeburg jesse.brandeb...@intel.com
original message
Hey all-
A security discussion was recently given:
Neil, I couple of comments below, I was just looking at the implementation
of this for e1000e.
On Mon, 28 Dec 2009, Neil Horman wrote:
Hey all-
A security discussion was recently given:
http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/Fahrplan//events/3596.en.html
And a patch that I submitted
On Tue, Jan 05, 2010 at 01:44:25PM -0800, Brandeburg, Jesse wrote:
Neil, I couple of comments below, I was just looking at the implementation
of this for e1000e.
On Mon, 28 Dec 2009, Neil Horman wrote:
Hey all-
A security discussion was recently given:
On Mon, Dec 28, 2009 at 12:10, Neil Horman nhor...@tuxdriver.com wrote:
Hey all-
A security discussion was recently given:
http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/Fahrplan//events/3596.en.html
And a patch that I submitted awhile back was brought up. Apparently some of
their testing
