Port 0xb2 on QEMU only sends an SMI to the currently executing processor.
The SMI handler, however, and in particular SmmWaitForApArrival, currently
expects that SmmControl2DxeTrigger triggers an SMI IPI on all processors
rather than just the BSP. Thus all SMM invocations loop for a second (the
default value of PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout) before SmmWaitForApArrival sends
another SMI IPI to the APs.
With the default SmmCpuFeaturesLib, 32-bit machines must broadcast SMIs
because 32-bit machines must reset the MTRRs on each entry to system
management modes (they have no SMRRs). However, our virtual platform
does not have problems with cacheability of SMRAM, so we can use "directed"
SMIs instead. To do this, just set gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode
to 1 (aka SmmCpuSyncModeRelaxedAp). This fixes SMM on multiprocessor virtual
machines.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonz...@redhat.com>
---
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 4 ++++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 4 ++++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
index 81adb31..96bdc73 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
@@ -373,6 +373,10 @@
gEfiIntelFrameworkModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellFile|{ 0x83, 0xA5, 0x04,
0x7C, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0x65, 0xE0, 0x52, 0x68, 0xD0, 0xB4, 0xD1 }
!endif
+!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
+ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
+!endif
+
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
# override the default values from SecurityPkg to ensure images from all
sources are verified in secure boot
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
index 1a8bfd2..4e4d65b 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
@@ -379,6 +379,10 @@
!endif
[PcdsFixedAtBuild.X64]
+!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
+ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
+!endif
+
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
# override the default values from SecurityPkg to ensure images from all
sources are verified in secure boot
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
index 9bf720a..54353d6 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
@@ -378,6 +378,10 @@
gEfiIntelFrameworkModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellFile|{ 0x83, 0xA5, 0x04,
0x7C, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0x65, 0xE0, 0x52, 0x68, 0xD0, 0xB4, 0xD1 }
!endif
+!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
+ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
+!endif
+
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
# override the default values from SecurityPkg to ensure images from all
sources are verified in secure boot
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04
--
2.5.0
_______________________________________________
edk2-devel mailing list
edk2-devel@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
