On 8/25/07, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading
and randomness.
There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been
studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see what
I
At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.
This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all,
the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
I would suggest a Condorcet method usind residual approbation weights
with an approval cut-off (noted | ).
It's a mix of Condorcet, IRV and approval.
The idea is:
1) to rank candidates using a Condorcet (ranked pairs, winning votes
for example) method;
2) eliminate
