Second try
Begin forwarded message:
From: Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: September 22, 2007 1:23:31 GMT+03:00
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Measuring power in a multi winner
election
Some random observations on the theme.
Seats != power seems
The straight forward question which criteria are important and which
not is a bit confusing to me since I tend to think that in many cases
there is no such absolute order of importance. We know that election
methods typically need to make some compromises between different
criteria since
I know that the Landau set is a subset of the Smith set, and I know that
Schwartz set is a subset of the Smith set, but is Landau set the subset of the
Schwartz set, or is the Schwartz set the subset of the Landau set? Or is it
entirely something else?
At 11:22 AM 9/21/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
The drive behind thes moves it usually that the old system fails to
translate votes into seats fairly. (Votes != Seats)
If we want to understand fair proportional representation, we must
look back to the principle of representation itself, and to
Hi,
--- Howard Swerdfeger [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
but most of these reforms fail to recognize that that Seats do not equal
power. So we are still still stuck with a similar problem (votes !=
power)
I was looking into 2 methods of measuring power in a weighted voting
system.
John,
--- John Wong [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I know that the Landau set is a subset of the Smith set, and I know that
Schwartz set is a subset of the Smith set, but is Landau set the subset
of the Schwartz set, or is the Schwartz set the subset of the Landau set?
Or is it entirely
I know that the Landau set is a subset of the Smith set, and I know
that Schwartz set is a subset of the Smith set, but is Landau set the
subset of the Schwartz set, or is the Schwartz set the subset of the
Landau set?
Both are possible, so neither is generally true. Given the votes
4:ABC
Kevin, Forest, interested participants,
My latest favourite FBC single-winner method:
1)Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballot, default 'no rating' interpreted
as bottom-rating.
2) Eliminate any candidate X who is above-bottom rated on fewer ballots
than is some
candidate Y on ballots that
That reminds me-what is the definition of the Landau set? How is different from
the Smith and Schwartz Set?
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2007 12:09:36 -0700
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Landau and Schwartz set
I know that the Landau set is a subset
I was briefly skimming the discussion area for Instant Runoff Voting in
Wikipedia (available here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Instant-runoff_voting
), and noticed where one of the contributors complained that comparisons
to Approval Voting ignored, quote, its theoretical criteria include
At 07:28 PM 9/23/2007, Michael Rouse wrote:
I was briefly skimming the discussion area for Instant Runoff Voting in
Wikipedia (available here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Instant-runoff_voting
), and noticed where one of the contributors complained that comparisons
to Approval Voting
At 07:28 PM 9/23/2007, Michael Rouse wrote:
I'm not trying to start an edit war on Wikipedia, but I do know there
are some proponents of both methods who have made, to my mind at least,
rather convincing arguments comparing the suitability of IRV to AV and
RV. I thought it might be interesting to
Rob,
--- Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
4:ABC
1:BCA
3:CAB
the Landau set is {A, B, C} and the Schwartz set is {A}.
The defeats are AB, BC, A=C. What reasoning do you use to find that
B and C are in the Landau set? I gather I don't have a complete
understanding of what Landau
Kevin Venzke wrote:
The defeats are AB, BC, A=C. What reasoning do you use to find that
B and C are in the Landau set? I gather I don't have a complete
understanding of what Landau refers to, but I'm very surprised if the
definition is such that a Landau winner can fail to be a Schwartz
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