Hello participants, I no longer advocate what I had touted as "my latest favourite FBC method" because Kevin Venzke pointed out how it could fail FBC, prompting me to compose this example:
10:A>C 09:B 03:C 10:D 02:D=B (or D>B or B>D, sincere is B>D) In SMD//FPP(W), using the "Strong Minimal Defense" device B eliminates A and then C wins. But if the 2D=B voters had instead voted D (meaning D>>B=C) then no candidate would be eliminated by SMD and so D would win. Thanks Kevin. I'm still interested in 3-slot methods that meet FBC or "3-slot Condorcet" and will probably post a (hopefully) better method suggestion soon. Chris Benham http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-September/020863.html Sun Sep 23 12:30:45 PDT 2007 Kevin, Forest, interested participants, My latest favourite FBC single-winner method: "1)Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballot, default 'no rating' interpreted as bottom-rating. 2) Eliminate any candidate X who is above-bottom rated on fewer ballots than is some candidate Y on ballots that bottom-rate X. 3) On ballots that top-rate no candidates, promote middle-rated candidates to top- rating. 4) Elect the candidate that is (now) top-rated on the greatest number of ballots". For (at least) the time being, I call this "Strong Minimal Defense//FPP(Whole)". It meets a new criterion I suggest that I tentatively label "Strong Minimal Defense" which states: "If X has fewer votes (ranking/rating above bottom or equal-bottom) in total than Y has on ballots that have no votes for X, then X can't win". It implies both Minimal Defense and the Plurality Criterion. <cut> Make the switch to the world's best email. Get the new Yahoo!7 Mail now. www.yahoo7.com.au/worldsbestemail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info