What is the meaning of the +?
=should have been +1
=I did not hit the 1 key hard enough
I would say it is that if X is ranked/rated strictly first by more than
half of the voters, then X should win.
=What would co-first candidates imply?
If the method doesn't satisfy FBC, how can this be
I don't see antiplurality as much worse than FPP.
Antiplurality (vote against one, candidate with fewest votes wins) meets
Majority Loser and Strong Favourite Betrayal.
Very bad is the Supplementary Vote used to elect some mayors in the
UK. It is like the Contingent Vote (one trip to the
--- En date de?: Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a
?crit?:
On the topic of whether there is a method that
satisfies both
Condorcet and FBC.
There is not. I believe I have demonstrated this in the past, by modifying
a Woodall proof that shows Condorcet to be incompatible with
Dear Greg,
I will focus on the question of majoritarianism in this message.
First my working definition of majoritarian method: A method is majoritarian
if for every option X and every group G consisting of more than half of the
voters, there is a way of voting for G which makes sure X wins
Greg, I am not sure if it is you email tool, but your posts don't seem
to be threading correctly for me.
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 7:20 AM, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I would say it is that if X is ranked/rated strictly first by more than
half of the voters, then X should win.
=What
On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
Let my honest rangings be:
100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella
0 percent for the other frontrunner Ugly Duckling
I
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 5:02 AM, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
PBV Proportional Borda Voting (n!) I see no reason why it wouldn't work.
PCV Proportional Condorcet Voting (n!) same comment as PBV
How do they work?
Also, do they meet the Droop proportionality criteron (or proportional
2008/10/16 Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
Let my honest rangings be:
100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella
0 percent
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 2:23 AM, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Each voter's sincere utilities are determined randomly and independently,
which is problematic because it does not produce realistic scenarios. It
would be better to combine voters into factions, although it would be no
Dear Raph,
you replied to me:
That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian
method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every
majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people
(the demos in greek).
They do have an
On Sun, Oct 12, 2008 at 1:42 AM, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I was attempting to make a distinction between an active and a passive
majority. Any active majority (one unwilling to make any compromises
whatsoever, voting every non-them candidate the lowest possible score) will
win. A
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 6:46 AM, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why doesn't France's Two Round System lead to the same result?
It could be argued that the first round is somewhat random. Also,
parties can combine temporarily without formally combining.
Pretend you
have a ballot
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 3:38 PM, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority
that is a bloc.
That's exactly my point. There are lots of such examples which all show
clearly that majoritarianism is not democratic.
The thing is
Hi Terry,
although FAWRB can be found in the lists archives, I use the opportunity
to give the current definition of ...
My favourite version of
FAWRB (Favourite or Approval Winner Random Ballot)
--
1. Each voter rates each option as either
Dear Raph,
you wrote:
The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'.
It is two groups voting as one.
Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are
sufficiently homogeneous?
That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still
overrule the
Jobst,
2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Dear Raph,
you wrote:
The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is
two groups voting as one.
Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are
sufficiently homogeneous?
That doesn't help
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Proportional Approval Voting
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Proportional-approval-voting
Brief summary of this method:
there are O(c!) (candidates factorial) many pseudocandidates
consisting of all the possible combinations of candidates.
Let's say we have a voter
Dear Diego,
But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if
the minority faction leader was the winner.
My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people.
My suggestion if your
scenario exists is:
1. Perform simultaneously an approval election and a
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Jeu 16.10.08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
De: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Objet: [EM] Worst Voting Method
À: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Jeudi 16 Octobre 2008, 1h45
I don't see antiplurality as much worse than FPP.
Hi Greg,
--- En date de : Jeu 16.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Complete non-sequitur but still a point I don't
entirely understand:
IRV, FPTP and Contingent Vote all lead to two party
domination according to
Duverger's law.
I don't think Duverger's law suggests this
Hi Greg,
--- En date de : Jeu 16.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I would say it is that if X is ranked/rated strictly first
by more than
half of the voters, then X should win.
=What would co-first candidates imply?
Neither of such candidates would be ranked/rated strictly
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Jeu 16.10.08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
De: Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Objet: Re: [EM] Strategic Voting and Simulating It
À: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Jeudi 16 Octobre 2008, 4h55
On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 2:23 AM, Kevin Venzke
I previously wrote a long math paper
The Best Rank-Order Voting System versus Range Voting
http://rangevoting.org/BestVrange.html
and I am now making it be a two-part sequence of papers. The 2nd part
is now done:
Best voting systems in D-dimensional politics models
Dear Jobst,
I will focus on the question of majoritarianism in this message.
First my working definition of majoritarian method: A method is
majoritarian if for every option X and every group G consisting of more than
half of the voters, there is a way of voting for G which makes sure X
-- Forwarded message --
From: Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 6:51 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
To: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Dear Jobst,
I will focus on the question of
These majorities, as described, seem close to identical twins, with little,
if any, ability for individual thinking.
Plurality promotes closeness for two major factions.
Voters have painful decisions which can result in real, if painful,
party strength - they cannot both back party
As I'm sure all of you have noticed, if you attempt to explain a voting
system that is better than FPTP to some average person/non-nerd they will
either:
a) say they don't understand it
b) attack you with some flawed conception of OMOV
c) say that the current system will never be changed
Which
I argue for Condorcet, include Range, Approval, and IRV in my discussion,
ad claim it to be the best for single winners.
For all these I talk of Best, Soso, Worst, and other unnamed candidates.
Pick the one or more candidates you would like to vote for.
Proceed by method:
Approval: You
Interesting. What I meant was what is the best method that actually has
some reasonable chance of being implemented. IRV has been implemented in
some cities and both Obama and McCain have stated that they support it, I
would say that qualifies as a reasonable chance. However, if you think that
Let's hypothesize about the impact various methods would have on society.
FPTP: If you live in the U.S., you see it every day. Two party domination is
fairly complete. Although this could be written off to the fact that America
started with a two-party system and that opposition is gerrymandered
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