Dear Greg,
you wrote:
Nondeterminism is a delightful way of skirting the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. All parties can be coaxed into exposing
their true opinions by resorting or the threat of resorting to chance.
Actually, if I remember correctly, that theorem just said that Random Ballot
Dear Raph,
you wrote:
I was thinking of a 'stable marriage problem' like solution.
Good idea! If it works, the main difficulty will be to make the whole process
monotonic, I guess...
Yours, Jobst
Each voter rates all the candidates.
Each voter will assign his winning probability to
Dear Kristofer,
you wrote:
With more candidates, a minority might find that it needs to approve of
a compromise with just slightly better expected value than random
ballot, if the majority says that it's not going to pick a compromise
closer to the minority than that just-slightly-better
Good Morning, Kristofer
There is so much good material in your message that, instead of
responding to all of it, I'm going to select bits and pieces and comment
on them, one at a time, until I've responded to all of them. I hope
this will help us focus on specific parts of the complex topic
Good Morning, Kristofer
In this message, I'll respond on the topic of accountability. I'll also
attach a copy of the original draft of the concept which may make my
ideas a bit clearer.
(Items from your letter, so I can see which ones I've answered.)
re: Yes. I think recall and the likes
Dear Forest,
good to hear from you again!
You said:
Not quite as important, but still valuable, is achieving partial cooperation
when that is the best that can be
done:
25 A1AA2
25 A2AA1
25 B
25 C
Here there isn't much hope for consensus, but it would be nice if the first
two
Dear Raph and Forest,
I have a new idea which might be monotonic, generalizing the 2-voter-marriage
idea to larger groups of voters.
I will define it as an optimization problem: basically, the idea is to find the
socially best lottery which can
be produced by starting from the Random Ballot
