Hi,
Greg Nisbet wrote on 10/18/08:
-snip-
The Electoral College:
This is generally regarded as a bad thing. No one really appears to
support it except as an adhoc version of asset voting.
-snip-
I don't believe the EC is generally accepted as a bad thing. (I picked
the Subject line above to
On Thu, Nov 6, 2008 at 2:58 PM, Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One widespread argument against the EC is that presidential candidates
ignore the voters in states where a candidate has a big lead. I don't
accept that. It seems more reasonable that the candidate with the big lead
has it
Steve Eppley wrote (Th. Nov.6):
Hi,
Greg Nisbet wrote on 10/18/08:
-snip-
The Electoral College:
This is generally regarded as a bad thing. No one really appears to
support it except as an adhoc version of asset voting.
-snip-
I don't believe the EC is generally accepted as a bad thing. (I
It unfortunately keeps getting longer and more subvided.
As of now there are 3 parts to the paper. I'm going to submit it to a
journal pretty soon.
Part I: http://rangevoting.org/BestVrange.html
Develops Bayesian Regret theory, finds BRs as closed formulas for a
lot of voting systems, proves
Good Afternoon, Kristofer
re: ... the process we're describing is an exponential one.
That's where it gains its power, but that also means that
the views a candidate has to integrate rises very quickly.
Thus it may not only be corruption that limits the
representation, but
Those documents make a good case. If you rule IRV/STV unconstitutional
due to non-monotonicity, you have to be prepared to rule open
primaries and top-two primaries unconstitutional as well.
Note also that other arguments by the MN Voter's Alliance would, if
successful, would render *any* voting
Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 16:51:31 -0500
From: Greg [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Those documents make a good case. If you rule IRV/STV unconstitutional
due to non-monotonicity, you have to be prepared to rule open
primaries and top-two primaries unconstitutional as well.
Your statement above is provably
ZERO defense here - it is time to be rid of the EC!
First a detail that scares many before they seriously consider change: The
EC is packaged such that each 100 voters in state X have as much power as
120 in CA or NY.
Could simply multiply state X counts by 120%.
I am NOT promoting
Kathy,
Those documents make a good case. If you rule IRV/STV unconstitutional
due to non-monotonicity, you have to be prepared to rule open
primaries and top-two primaries unconstitutional as well.
Your statement above is provably false Greg since plurality voting in
both primary and
Hi again,
here's another, somewhat more stable method which also achieves the
following:
...
provides for strategic equilibria in which C is elected with 100%, 55%,
and 100% probability, respectively, in the following situations:
Situation 1:
55% A(100)C(70)B(0)
45% B(100)C(70)A(0)
On Nov 6, 2008, at 6:58 AM, Steve Eppley wrote:
Greg Nisbet wrote on 10/18/08:
-snip-
The Electoral College:
This is generally regarded as a bad thing. No one really appears to
support it except as an adhoc version of asset voting.
-snip-
I don't believe the EC is generally accepted as a bad
Stephane,
You are confusing the spoiler effect with monotonicity.
Plurality voting is ALWAYS monotonic.
Neither IRV or plurality solve the spoiler problem.
Both are susceptible to strategizing. I don't know any voting method
that is not.
Does anyone have anything helpful to add?
Kathy
On
On Nov 6, 2008, at 8:26 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Both are susceptible to strategizing. I don't know any voting method
that is not.
Random Dictator.
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