[EM] IRV's Squeeze Feature

Forest, You wrote, setting up your attack on IRV: Suppose that the voters are distributed uniformly on a disc with center C, and that they are voting to choose from among several locations for a community center. (a) That is quite a big suppose, and  (b) I agree that IRV would not be among the

Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative

At 03:17 AM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: James Gilmour wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 10:52 PM The tragedy is that IRV is replacing Top Two Runoff, an older reform that actually works better than IRV. I have seen statements like this quite a few

Re: [EM] language/framing quibble

Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Morning, Kristofer [The following relates to the corruption of elected officials after they take office.] re: ... make the system so competitive that the pressure to be honest is greater than that to become corrupt. I don't think it can be done by the

Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative

At 10:09 AM 12/4/2008, James Gilmour wrote: Kristofer MunsterhjelmSent: Thursday, December 04, 2008 8:17 AM I'm not Abd, but I think the argument goes like this: in TTR, if a (usually) third candidate gets enough FPP votes to make it to the second round, that candidate has a real chance

Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 1

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 10:37 AM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Something I've always wondered about Asset Voting. Say you have a very selfish electorate who all vote for themselves (or for their friends). From what I understand, those voted for in the first round become the

[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: For the benefit of those who aren't familiar with the terminology, Supplementary Vote is top-two batch-elimination IRV. In the United States, there are or have been a few implementations of SV, and FairVote claims these as IRV successes. That's not quite standard

[EM] IRV's Starlike Noncompliance

Recently we have seen how easy it is to construct examples of IRV's Squeeze Effect which results in candidates being isolated from their own win regions in Yee/B.Olson Diagrams. In the case of three candidates, the squeezed out candidate is always the one opposite the longest side of the

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

At 01:38 PM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: Ballots do not ask for the voter's sincere opinion. They ask voters to make a choice or choices. I think that is incorrect. Ranked methods ask for the sincere opinion of the voter, and that opinion can be well