On 1.6.2011, at 13.48, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Hi,
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I agree with Kevin that elect the CW if there is one,
else elect the
candidate ranked
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
If there are three candidates and their declared preferences are ABC, BCA
and CAB, the method may introduce some additional problems. If most voters
delegate, then we may easily
There has been quite a lot of discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities
of Condorcet methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and in most typical
elections their vanilla versions are simply good enough. In the case
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
additional step of recounting the top two without
It's easy to minimize the problems with one's preferred systems, and focus
on the problems with other systems you see as competing for mindshare.
It's not even dishonest: the truth is that, compared to the giant issues
with plurality, any good system has problems that are minor, but that on the
On 8.6.2011, at 16.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
It's easy to minimize the problems with one's preferred systems, and focus on
the problems with other systems you see as competing for mindshare. It's
not even dishonest: the truth is that, compared to the giant issues with
plurality, any good
In SODA I'm most worried about the Approval related problems,
Do you mean the near-clone game-of-chicken problems? These apply to WV
Condorcet methods too (although less-obviously to an unsophisticated voter),
and with margins, there is the opposite burial problem:
35: AB
25: B
40: C
What
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
additional
On 8.6.2011, at 18.58, Jameson Quinn wrote:
In SODA I'm most worried about the Approval related problems,
Do you mean the near-clone game-of-chicken problems?
Yes.
These apply to WV Condorcet methods too (although less-obviously to an
unsophisticated voter), and with margins, there is
On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 8:58 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
From my experience talking to normal people not already interested in
voting or math, I think that it is very important to keep your list of
proposals short. 1 is good, 2 is tolerable, 3 is approximately pointless,
On 7.6.2011, at 10.53, Peter Zbornik wrote:
I'd say that FBC (and LNH) is quite a big problem for Condorcet
methods, at least for someone (like me) who think sincere voting
should be the norm.
One could also claim that in typical political elections Condorcet methods will
work fine, and
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and
in
On 9.6.2011, at 1.31, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
I've posted a full definition. However, this
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are
some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I agree with Kevin that elect the CW if there
is one,
else
On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. Before the election, candidates (including declared write-ins)
submit full rankings of other candidates.
...
i still think this Asset thingie is
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of
Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. Before the election, candidates (including declared write-ins) submit
full rankings of
It seems I have to give one more example to cover also
cases where the difference between major an minor candidates
is not that clear.
26: AB
25: BA
49: C
Again, if two of the B supporters vote BC, then B wins.
If some A and B supporters truncate in order to defend
against
On Jun 8, 2011, at 10:32 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. Before the election, candidates
Juho,
I think the coming paper in votingmatters on hybrid methods, shows
that strategy voting can be a problem in Condorcet methods (beatpath).
I would say that fears in a sense always are irrational, as they are
emotions. I think, that fears increase the chance of survival in many
cases though
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