It looks very nearly a tie, which complicates things. :)
In the weighted proportional method I described in another email, the
results would be (for a slate of 3 candidates, and ten votes for each pair
mentioned in the problem).
ABC = 60
ABD = 60
ABE = 60
ACD = 50
ACE = 50
ADE = 50
BCD = 50
BCE =
Normal Proportional Approval Voting would give it to ABC, ABD or ABE based on
satisfaction. Everyone has voted for one of the elected candidates and some get
two. Whereas with CDE, it's purely one each, but as you say this is envy-free.
While I can see the merits of the envy-free argument, I wou
> mrou...@mrouse.com wrote:
>> I emailed Forest about using weighted voting systems (ones where
>> candidates, rather than parties, have different voting power in the
>> legislature), and he suggested posting it to the group for discussion.
>>
>>
>> The following method could be used with Approval,
This is to illustrate a point that Warren has recorded on his website somewhere
(I don't remember
exactly where); namely that lack of summability is not insurmountable.
We start with the assumption that the voters have range style ballots on a
scale of zero to six. [Seven
levels are about opt
mrou...@mrouse.com wrote:
I emailed Forest about using weighted voting systems (ones where
candidates, rather than parties, have different voting power in the
legislature), and he suggested posting it to the group for discussion.
The following method could be used with Approval, Range, and Bord
Toby,
it is much easier to get a clone independent measure of distance or of
proximity with range style ballots
than with voter rankings, i.e. cardinal ratings are better than ordinal
rankings in this context.
Once you have a way of measuring distance (or alternatively proximity) between
cand
I emailed Forest about using weighted voting systems (ones where
candidates, rather than parties, have different voting power in the
legislature), and he suggested posting it to the group for discussion.
The following method could be used with Approval, Range, and Borda ballots.
1. Determine th
Forest and I were discussing PR last week and the following situation came
up. Suppose there are five candidates, A, B, C, D, E. A and B evenly
divide the electorate and, in a completely orthogonal way, C, D, and E
evenly divide the electorate. That is:
One-sixth of the electorate approves A a
