Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV

On 29.11.2011, at 6.07, C.Benham wrote: In IRV if you are convinced of that you have no compelling reason to compromise because you can expect F to be eliminated and your vote transferred to C. No, to have a good reason to compromise you must be convinced that F *will* be one of the top 2

Re: [EM] new revised ranked pair method in matrix form

Refinement: Don't determine winner until the end. C_i is the ith candidate. Initially M is the Identity matrix of size equal to the number of candidates. The pairs are ranked in order. Affirm each group of equally ranked pairs in order, from highest to lowest. To Affirm a group of equally

Re: [EM] Simplest paper count to produce a winner in the smith set.

Clinton Mead wrote: What would be the simplest paper count that will produce a winner in the smith set? I'm not completely sure how your method works, but how about this? Count the number of ballots on which each candidate is ranked (in any position). Call each candidate's count his approval

[EM] Jameson: MMT, MTAOC, MJ

Jameson-- You had said: Majority Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case. [endquote] I asked: Does it? Who knows? You replied: Anyone who takes the time to read the academic literature. [endquote] Translation: You yourself don't know the answer. MJ's advocates are

Re: [EM] Simplest paper count to produce a winner in the smith set.

On Wed, Nov 30, 2011 at 2:47 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com wrote: Clinton Mead wrote: What would be the simplest paper count that will produce a winner in the smith set? Then while there is more than one candidate left, eliminate the pairwise loser of the two remaining

[EM] Approval vs IRV

To say that IRV fails FBC is an understatement. IRV fails FBC with a vengeance. IRV thereby makes a joke any election in which it is used. As I've already said, all it takes is for favoriteness-support to taper moderately gradually away from the middle, something that is hardly unusual.

[EM] Small omission in MTAOC program

In the last of the three program sections, there should be one thing added to the instructions in the if-statement: recalculate par(x,y) Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Jameson: MMT, MTAOC, MJ

I honestly don't understand your hostility to me. Can you explain it? 2011/11/29 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com Jameson-- You had said: Majority Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case. [endquote] I asked: Does it? Who knows? You replied: Anyone who takes the time

Re: [EM] Simplest paper count to produce a winner in the smith set.

You can eliminate all candidates that have less than half the top approval score, immediately. Australia is a bad example because they require full ranking; but without that requirement, you could expect that each candidate's approval total will be something on the order of min(50%, 2xFirst

Re: [EM] Approval vs. IRV (hopefully tidier re-send)

On 28 Nov 2011 20:24:37 -0800, Chris Benham wrote: Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011): Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV? To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler

Re: [EM] ... wrt Burlington et al.

again, the subject is not about me and the header should reflect that. On 11/27/11 4:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: dlw: The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de facto center. KM: But positioning yourself around the de

[EM] Approval vs. IRV

Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011): We may compare IRV also to the other commonly used single-winner method TTR. To be brief, one could say that IRV is better than TTR since it has more elimination rounds. IRV's problem in this comparison is that it collects so much information that one can,