Mutual-Majority-Top (MMT):
A set of candidates who are each rated above bottom by each member of the
same majority of the voters is a majority candidate set.
If there are one or more majority candidate sets, then the winner is the
most top-rated candidate who is in a majority candidate set.
If
Chris--
I'll describe Forest's proposal briefly:
It's minmax margins (but it's defined as maxmin, with respect to xy - yx),
looking at all pairwise comparisons, rather than just at defeats.
But, instead of just xy - yx, it's x top or y - yx.
As I said in my other posting, it seems to have
David said:
Grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change [two-party
dominated system in US]
[endquote]
How right David is: With IRV, two-party domination in the U.S. will always
be with us.
My subject-line didn't say everything it should have:
IRV is for when there's
The simplest PR system: open list Approval Transferable Vote.
ATF for multiwinner elections:
Quota (easy): Q = (Nballots + 1)/(Nseats + 1)
A voter may approve any number of candidates.
Each ballot is initially weighted as 1.0.
Count weighted approval totals. At same time, count weighted
On 05 Dec 2011 12:46:41 -0800, Ted Stern wrote:
The simplest PR system: open list Approval Transferable Vote.
ATF for multiwinner elections:
Correction, ATV. Blame it on Monday ...
-- Ted
Quota (easy): Q = (Nballots + 1)/(Nseats + 1)
A voter may approve any number of candidates.
Mike is right; it should be called MaxMin instead of MinMax.
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Subject: [EM] Chris: Forest's FBC/ABC method
Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Chris--
I'll describe Forest's proposal briefly:
It's minmax margins (but it's defined as
