[EM] Oops! MMPO with summed disapprovals as an opposition elects B in ABE. FBC/ABE roundup.

Forest-- The Approval bad-example: 27: AB 24: B 49: C B's negative score is 49, the number who rank C over B, and also the number who don't rank B C's negative score is 51, the number who rank B over C, and also the number who don't rank C A's negative score is 73, the number who don't

Re: [EM] Oops! MMPO with summed disapprovals as an opposition elects B in ABE. FBC/ABE roundup.

2012/1/11 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com Forest-- The Approval bad-example: 27: AB 24: B 49: C B's negative score is 49, the number who rank C over B, and also the number who don't rank B C's negative score is 51, the number who rank B over C, and also the number who don't rank C

[EM] I should have listed SODA. The conditional methods win, _among the ballots-only methods_.

Jameson-- Yes, sorry to have again missed SODA in my list of FBC/AOC methods. Methods involving delegation or proxy can do a good job of avoiding strategy problems. I suggest that Proxy Direct Democracy, as I've described it during the last few months on EM, is the obvious best form of

[EM] Clarifying Enhanced DMC (AKA SPARR Voting)

Consider Enhanced DMC as defined in this message from Forest Simmons, dated July 12, 2011: http://old.nabble.com/-EM--Enhanced-DMC-td32048790.html I prefer the name Strong Preference Approval Round Robin (SPARR), following from the idea that this is a form of Condorcet (Instant Round Robin) that