The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives criterion (IIA, also sometimes
abbreviated IIAC) is a bit of a silly criterion. Arguably, no system really
passes it. For any ranked system, just take a simple ABCA 3-candidate
Condorcet cycle, and then remove the irrelevant candidate who loses to
the
It is my impression that the only situations in which IIAC fails is
when there is no majority.
Would it be possible to get around IIAC by adding a two-candidate
runoff?
Ted
On 29 Mar 2012 05:35:47 -0700, Jameson Quinn wrote:
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives criterion (IIA, also
On 03/29/2012 09:41 PM, Ted Stern wrote:
It is my impression that the only situations in which IIAC fails is
when there is no majority.
Would it be possible to get around IIAC by adding a two-candidate
runoff?
I don't think so. In a subset of all possible two-round elections, the
voters are
