>> After an election, any candidate can withdraw from the election, and
>> call for a new count of the ballots, with his name deleted from all
>> the ballots.
>>
>> I liked JITW, because it saves FBC-failing methods from their FBC failure.
>> .
>
> Maybe. You could end up with a "chicken" dilem
Jameson:
> But the criterion's premise stipulates optimal voting. Voting to
> maximize one's utility-expectation. That's extreme voting.
Unproven assertion. One which I believe is based on sound logic but faulty
assumptions, and is therefore false.
[endquote]
Sure, the matter of what way of vot
2013/1/10 Michael Ossipoff
> On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 6:48 PM, Jameson Quinn
> wrote:
>
> >> I suggest that you'll find that no non-probabilistic and
> >> non-dictatorial method can meet Strong IIAC, as defined above.
>
> > I agree. However, they will break it with different probabilities, given
>
On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 6:48 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>> I suggest that you'll find that no non-probabilistic and
>> non-dictatorial method can meet Strong IIAC, as defined above.
> I agree. However, they will break it with different probabilities, given a
> universe of scenarios. For a realistic
On Tue, Jan 8, 2013 at 12:43 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:
> Here's Steve's proposed fix:
>
> After an election, any candidate can withdraw from the election, and
> call for a new count of the ballots, with his name deleted from all
> the ballots.
>
> I liked JITW, because it saves FBC-failing metho
