Hi
I'm trying to implement the Schulze STV method and are currently working
through the paper schulze2.pdf.
On page 38 there is an example (section 6.3) where this result was arrived
at:
N[{a,b,c},d] = 169;
and Ñ[{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}] = 169;
And i can't seem to figure out how to arrive at the
On 06/29/2013 09:38 AM, Alexander Kjäll wrote:
Hi
I'm trying to implement the Schulze STV method and are currently working
through the paper schulze2.pdf.
On page 38 there is an example (section 6.3) where this result was
arrived at:
N[{a,b,c},d] = 169;
and Ñ[{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}] = 169;
And i
Hallo,
N[{a,b,c},d] = 169 or Ñ[{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}] = 169 means
that W=169 is the largest value such that the electorate
can be divided into 4 disjoint parts T1,T2,T3,T4 such that
(1) Every voter in T1 prefers candidate a to candidate d;
and T1 consists of at least W voters.
(2) Every voter in T2
On 06/29/2013 11:32 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
N[{a,b,c},d] = 169 or Ñ[{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}] = 169 means
that W=169 is the largest value such that the electorate
can be divided into 4 disjoint parts T1,T2,T3,T4 such that
(1) Every voter in T1 prefers candidate a to candidate d;
and T1
Hallo,
the precise algorithm is described in the file calcul02.pdf
of this zip file:
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze3.zip
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Vidar Wahlberg,
One very simple rule that transcends the dichotomy between a party-list and
a candidate-based PR election rule is 3-seat LR Hare. Each party has one
candidate and each voter one vote. Typically the top 3 vote-getters would
get one seat each, but if the top vote-getter beats the
On 06/29/2013 01:27 AM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 03:04:13PM +0200, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This gave me an idea.
We seem to agree that it's notably the exclusion part that may end up
excluding a party that is preferred by many, but just isn't their first
preference.
I'm
At 10:19 AM 6/28/2013, Chris Benham wrote:
Jameson,
...But I don't think it's realistic...
I don't think any of the multiple majorities scenarios are very
realistic. Irrespective of how they are resolved,
all voters who regard one or more of the viable candidates as
unacceptable will have a
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (29 June 2013):
The combined method would go like this:
1. Run the ballots through RP (or Schulze, etc). Reverse the outcome ordering
(or the ballots; these systems are reversal symmetric so it doesn't matter).
Call the result the elimination order.
2.
