Dear Steve Eppley,
the following criterion has been discussed several
times in the Election Methods mailing list:
Suppose a majority of the voters prefers candidate A
to candidate B. Then candidate B must not be elected,
unless there is a sequence of candidates from
candidate B to
Among other things, in Wahlberg's thread, there was a discussion about
ways of making Sainte-Laguë party list PR accommodate ranked ballots.
The simplest method found was:
1. Allocate seats according to Sainte-Laguë or Webster with respect to
first preference votes.
2. If any party got zero
At 08:13 AM 7/5/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
IMC seems to me to be too narrow to be a general criterion, if only
one custom-built voting system passes it. WIMC is an interesting
refinement of Condorcet and Smith. But neither belongs on Wikipedia
without a reliable citation.
2013/7/5
On 07/06/2013 02:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The method should be weakly summable (i.e. when the number of parties
are kept constant). For each cell in the matrix, do the elimination
first, then store the counts for each party. These counts can be summed
up between districts, so if n
At 08:37 PM 7/5/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
