[EM] Ranking of Greeen-scenario methods.

2013-10-14 Thread Michael Ossipoff
Merit ranking of methods, for the Green scenario: 1. Woodall 2. Benham 3. AIRV (defined below) 4. IRV 5. Beatpath, RP, Approval, Score AIRV (Approval-IRV): Same as IRV, except allows equal ranking (at least for 1st place), and all the candidates currently sharing top position in a ranking are

[EM] Properties their justification. Conditions.

2013-10-14 Thread Michael Ossipoff
For votinig-systems, properties are really important. That should be obvious. What else is important in choosing among voting-systems? At such time as any voting-system may be proposed to the public, it would obviously be necessary to tell its properties. Especiallly its purported advantages in

Re: [EM] MMPO(IAMPO) (was IA/MMPO)

2013-10-14 Thread Forest Simmons
Kevin and Jameson, thanks for the insights and suggestions. It's kind of you to suggest my name, Jameson, but I would rather something more descriptive similar to the potential approval winner set of Chris and Kevin or more public relations friendly like the Democratically Acceptable Set. My

Re: [EM] MMPO(IAMPO) (was IA/MMPO)

2013-10-14 Thread Jameson Quinn
OK, then could we call it the First-level-strategic Approval Winner set or the 1SAW set for short? I suspect better names are possible, but I can't think of one. As an aside: I think exploring good ranked methods like this is worthwhile from a theoretical point of view. But from a practical

[EM] Chicken Dilemma--To whom is it a problem?

2013-10-14 Thread Michael Ossipoff
Someone at EM (when he was more honest?) said that the chicken dilemma is voting-systems' most intractable problem. But others here say or imply that it won't be a problem. Sure, if you're a committed advocate of Beatpath, and if Beatpath is vulnerable to chicken dilemma, then you're going to

Re: [EM] MMPO(IAMPO) (was IA/MMPO)

2013-10-14 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Forest, I should say, it seems I went too far in describing the potential approval winner set idea. That idea is only descriptive for the ordinary Plurality criterion that is based on strict first preferences (because you can assume that the approvals for those candidates would still be