My concern had been that, in IRV, a party, in order to gain media-support, might instruct its voters to rank, in 2nd place, a media-promoted party's candidate.
But there are several reasons why that shouldn't be a problem in the Green scenario. 1. With the open media offered in the Green platform, there wouldn't be corporate control of media, or a media agenda to promote corporate-owned parties, or any particular parties. Therefore there wouldn't be pressure, need or incentive for a party, to please the media, to recommend voting against preference. 2. With that more open media, and especially if the non-CW-preferring wing of the mutual majority (MM) could be large enough to eliminate the CW, then voters would have heard, via the media, about its platform policy proposals, and, would be well-aware of the great similarity of policies within the MM. 3. If that wing might be large enough to eliminate the CW, then, in the event that it isn't quite that large, and it gets eliminated first, the CW would very much want its transfer votes, and so there would be incentive to not offend that wing whose support could be important. For those reasons, I suggest that there is little reason to doubt that a progressive mutually majority would be voted as such, in IRV, in the Green scenario. Michael Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info