On Nov 29, 2009, at 6:37 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to
tabulate
the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV (asset
voting, I might call it commodity voting: your vote is a
Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate
the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV (asset
voting, i might call it commodity voting: your vote is a
commodity that you transfer according to your
On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:05 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate
the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV (asset
voting, i might call it commodity voting: your vote is a
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if the
case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious about).
where there is a Condorcet winner and that person is elected, is there
still possible later harm?
As far as I
On Nov 25, 2009, at 3:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if
the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am
dubious about). where there is a Condorcet winner and that person
is
Trying to sort this out as to Condorcet and LNH:
Seems that cycles are involved before, after, or both. And the voters
change their votes, getting more affect on result than they might
expect. So what, assuming the counters properly read the vote?
I agree with those who expect cycles to
On Nov 10, 2009, at 7:40 AM, Matthew Welland wrote:
Also, again, your single vote is irrelevant.
except in a close election.
It is the aggregate of
thousands or millions of votes that will make or break A vs. B. How
many
feel so strongly against A that they cannot vote for him or her?
In large elections with evenly spread voters and candidates and no
strategies the distribution of Approval votes may indeed be such that
the best candidate regularly wins. The situation may however be also
different. I gave one simple example where the left wing had two
candidates and the
Matthew Welland wrote:
So, to re-frame my question. What is the fatal flaw with approval? I'm
not interested in subtle flaws that result in imperfect results. I'm
interested in flaws that result in big problems such as those we see
with plurality and IRV.
IMHO, it is that you need
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 10:37 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
IMHO, it is that you need concurrent polling in order to consistently elect
a good winner. If you don't have polling and thus don't know where to put
the cutoff (between approve and not-approve), you'll face
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:37:56 am Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Matthew Welland wrote:
So, to re-frame my question. What is the fatal flaw with approval? I'm
not interested in subtle flaws that result in imperfect results. I'm
interested in flaws that result in big problems such as
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Kristofer,
both Approval Voting and Range Voting *are* majoritarian: A majority
can always get their will and suppress the minority by simply bullet-voting.
So, a more interesting version of your question could be: Which
*democratic* method (that does not allow any
Hello Kristofer,
you wrote:
However, my point was that Range goes further: a minority that acts
in a certain way can get what it wants, too; all that's required is that
the majority does not vote Approval style (either max or min) and that
the minority does, and that the minority is not too
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hello Kristofer,
you wrote:
You could probably devise a whole class of SEC-type methods. They would
go: if there is a consensus (defined in some fashion), then it wins -
otherwise, a nondeterministic strategy-free method is used to pick the
winner. The advantage of yours
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 8:11 PM, Jobst Heitzig heitzi...@web.de wrote:
Hello Kristofer,
Assume (for the sake of simplicity) that we can get ranked information
from the voters. What difference would a SEC with Random Pair make, with
respect to Random Ballot?
This sounds interesting, but what
Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 8:11 PM, Jobst Heitzig heitzi...@web.de wrote:
Hello Kristofer,
Assume (for the sake of simplicity) that we can get ranked information
from the voters. What difference would a SEC with Random Pair make, with
respect to Random Ballot?
This sounds
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
In the context of SEC, it would be:
Voter submits two ballots - one is ranked and the other is a Plurality
ballot. Call the first the fallback ballot, and the second the consensus
ballot.
If everybody (or
Warren Smith wrote:
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to
analysis, preferably at a layman level, that contradicts or supports
Dear Kristofer,
both Approval Voting and Range Voting *are* majoritarian: A majority can always
get their will and suppress the minority by simply bullet-voting.
So, a more interesting version of your question could be: Which *democratic*
method (that does not allow any sub-group to suppress
OK, this is an attempt to reply to Robert Bristow-Johnson.
WDS: For Condorcet systems with ranking-equalities
allowed,
they might behave better with strategic voters, though. I've posted
on that topic before.
RBJ: ... so [range is] *not* always better than every rank-order system for
...
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to
analysis, preferably at a layman level, that contradicts or supports this
assertion?
Or,
On Nov 7, 2009, at 3:12 PM, Matthew Welland wrote:
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to
analysis, preferably at a layman level,
On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 8:12 PM, Matthew Welland m...@kiatoa.com wrote:
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small.
The recommended strategy in approval is to
Raph Frank wrote:
On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 8:12 PM, Matthew Welland m...@kiatoa.com wrote:
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small.
The recommended strategy
On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 10:57 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
The recommended strategy in approval is to approve one of the top 2
and also any other candidates who are above your approval threshold.
That's strategy T. Some times (see Rob LeGrand's dissertation defense
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to
analysis, preferably at a layman level, that contradicts or supports this
assertion?
Or, in
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