Kevin,
You wrote (25 Jan 2009):
I think there ought to be a clear distinction between criteria whose
violation is absurd no matter what the circumstances, and criteria
whose violation is absurd due to other available options.
I don't see why (particularly).
There are very few (named) criteria
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Ven 23.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
I can't see what's so highly absurd about
failing mono-append. It's
basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that
doesn't seem
especially more important. Is it absurd to fail
mono-raise?
The
Kevin,
I can't see what's so highly absurd about failing mono-append. It's
basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that doesn't seem
especially more important. Is it absurd to fail mono-raise?
The absurdity of failing mono-append is compounded by the cheapness of
meeting it. As with
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Lun 12.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
Kevin,
You wrote (11 Jan 2009):
There are reasons for criteria to be
important other than how easy they are to
satisfy.
Otherwise why would we ever bother to satisfy the difficult
criteria?
Well,
Paul Kislanko wrote:
This still makes no sense to me, since C has no more a majority in case 2
than it had in case 1.
If mutual majority selects (A B) in case 1 and (A B C) in case 2, it makes
no sense at all and should never be mentioned again.
Mutual majority can still be useful. Let's
...@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Kevin
Venzke
Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 1:25 PM
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard?
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Sam 10.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha
-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On
Behalf Of
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2009 2:23 AM
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc: 'Markus Schulze'
Subject: Re: [EM] Beatpath GMC compliance a
mistaken standard?
Paul Kislanko wrote:
This still makes no sense to me
Hi Paul,
Regarding mutual majority:
The problem is that the BA voters cannot be counted as solidly committed
to {A}. They can only be counted to {B} and {A,B}. The additional A
bullet voters can only be counted to {A}. C was excluded in scenario 1
because {A,B} possessed a majority. The new A
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
Here words Now Mutual Majority elects
{A,B,C} are a bit confusing since mutual
majority doesn't set any requirements on
who should be elected (nor elect anyone).
...
Kevin,
You wrote (10 Jan 2009):
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
Oops! (I knew that!) Sorry for falsely contradicting you.
Why is mono-add-plump important?
Because as an election method
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Let's consider the first election first, with
truncation extended to full preference:
26: A B C
25: B A C
49: C A = B
A B C: 100 prefer {A B C} to the empty set
This case is
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Let's consider the first election first, with
truncation extended to full preference:
26: A B C
25: B A C
49:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
If there is a set of voters that form a
majority and they all prefer all candidates
of set A to all candidates of set B then
candidates of set B should not win.
This helps A (as requested) by at least
] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard? JL
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Monday, 12 January, 2009, 12:20 AM
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu
juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
If there is a set of voters that form a
majority and they all prefer all candidates
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
Kevin,
You wrote (10 Jan 2009):
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
Oops! (I knew that!)
Kevin,
You wrote (11 Jan 2009):
There are reasons for criteria to be important other than how easy they are
to satisfy.
Otherwise why would we ever bother to satisfy the difficult criteria?
Well, if as I said none of the criteria were incompatible with each other
then
presumably none of the
Dear Paul Kislanko,
Kevin Venzke wrote (10 Jan 2009):
[Situation #1]
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
[Situation #2]
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
You wrote (10 Jan 2009):
I guess I don't understand mutual
] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard?
Dear Paul Kislanko,
Kevin Venzke wrote (10 Jan 2009):
[Situation #1]
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
[Situation #2]
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
You wrote (10 Jan
Dear Paul Kislanko,
I wrote (10 Jan 2009):
For situation #2, we get:
column1 / column2
A / 31
B / 25
C / 49
AB / 51
AC / 0
BC / 0
So mutual majority says nothing.
You wrote (10 Jan 2009):
How can mutual majority say nothing? Only
if no combination has a majority. But A is in
the
Hi Paul,
--- En date de : Sam 10.1.09, Paul Kislanko kisla...@airmail.net a écrit :
If a majority of voters (with the new voters, and where did
they come from
anyway)
You can view them as voters who are debating staying home instead of
voting. The issue is whether this can benefit them and
Of Kevin
Venzke
Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 4:07 PM
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard?
Hi Paul,
--- En date de : Sam 10.1.09, Paul Kislanko kisla...@airmail.net a écrit :
If a majority of voters (with the new voters, and where did
Dear Paul Kislanko,
you wrote (10 Jan 2009):
The second scenario is
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
which has 105 voters. 56 include A on any ballot
and that's a majority. 51 include B, and that's
not a majority.
So how is B a possible winner under the second
scenario?
Mutual majority
PM
To: kisla...@airmail.net; election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard?
Dear Paul Kislanko,
you wrote (10 Jan 2009):
The second scenario is
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
which has 105 voters. 56 include A on any ballot
and that's a majority
Dear Paul Kislanko,
you wrote (10 Jan 2009):
The second scenario is
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
I ask again, in the post I replied to, it was claimed
mutual majority selected (A,B,C) in the 2nd case. I
wondered how that was possible, and you agree that it
isn't.
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Marcus,
You wrote (8 Jan 2009):
Statement #1: Criterion X does not imply criterion Y.
Statement #2: Criterion X and criterion Y are incompatible.
Statement #1 does not imply statement #2. But in your
29 Dec 2008 mail, you mistakenly assume that statement #1
implies statement #2.
No I didn't.
Dear Chris Benham,
you are the only one who uses the fact, that criterion X
doesn't imply criterion Y, as an argument against
criterion X. That's the same as rejecting monotonicity
for not implying independence of clones.
Your argumentation is not complicated.
It is simply false.
Markus Schulze
Marcus,
You wrote (29 Dec,2008):
You wrote: All three candidates have a majority beatpath
to each other, so GMC says that any of them are allowed to
win. No! Beatpath GMC doesn't say that any of them are
allowed to win; beatpath GMC only doesn't exclude any of
them from winning.
I can't see
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (29 Dec 2008):
I think that compliance with GMC is a mistaken standard
in the sense that the best methods should fail it.
The GMC concept is spectacularly vulnerable to Mono-add-Plump!
[Situation #1]
25: AB
26: BC
23: CA
04: C
78 ballots (majority
28 matches
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