At 01:30 AM 4/20/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Or other advanced method. What is often overlooked in the discussion
of voting methods, due to the emphasis on deterministic methods that
always find a winner with one ballot, is that runoff
Dave Ketchum wrote 17 April 2010:
First, quoting Wikipedia:
A Condorcet method is any single-winner election method that meets
the Condorcet criterion, that is, which always selects the Condorcet
winner, the candidate who would beat each of the other candidates in
a run-off election, if
Somehow this thread forgot its primary address - sorry.
On Apr 21, 2010, at 11:04 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Dave, i think you meant to respond to the EM list, not?
i think you and i are on the same side, i just would not expect
adopting Preferential Voting (be it Condorcet or IRV or
The same logic applies also to the Condorcet criterion. We all
probably agree on what terms Condorcet criterion, Condorcet
method, Condorcet-complying method are intended to refer to. Term
Condorcet might refer to any of these or maybe to Marquis de
Condorcet (in the EM framework). If one
On Apr 21, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:30 AM 4/20/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Or other advanced method. What is often overlooked in the discussion
of voting methods, due to the emphasis on deterministic methods that
On Apr 21, 2010, at 3:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Somehow this thread forgot its primary address - sorry.
On Apr 21, 2010, at 11:04 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Dave, i think you meant to respond to the EM list, not?
i think you and i are on the same side, i just would not expect
Kevin Venzke wrote:
The Burlington votes are inspiring. I'm amazed at how close the
first preference counts were, and that a fourth candidate even got
15%. Unfortunately the resolution is so stereotypical you could
think it was contrived to make a point.
What worries me is the possibility
Some examples of distribution of seats between political parties (I
believe these are all proportional or close to proportional).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Belgium#Chamber_of_Representatives
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Denmark#Last_election_results
James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:03 AM
I dunno about France, but is that the case in Italy? or Israel? I
thought there were a bunch of countries with a half dozen
contending parties or more. it looks to me that even the UK has
three significant
At 11:55 PM 4/18/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
There are many elections with only one reasonable choice - such as a
good qualified worker trying for re-election. Here even FPP would be
fine, and we hope for nothing that makes voting unreasonably labor
intensive.
The many with two reasonable
Hi Robert,
A quick response.
--- En date de : Dim 18.4.10, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com a écrit :
my metric of goodness for an election method is not
minimizing Bayesean regret but is in minimizing mean voter
disappointment in the election result.
It's hard for me to
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:55 PM 4/18/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
There are many elections with only one reasonable choice - such as a
good qualified worker trying for re-election. Here even FPP would be
fine, and we hope for nothing that makes voting
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
Why IRV? Have we not buried
that deep enough? Why not Condorcet which does better
with about the same voting?
In the context that I said I wanted to use IRV, I wanted to preserve
LNHarm. It's kind of a
Hi,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com a écrit :
but cycles don't always happen, and i
would bet that they rarely happen in the real world.
[Burlington example]
I actually view this as possibly evidence of a possibly correctable
problem. Or at
On Apr 18, 2010, at 11:08 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, Dave Ketchum
da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
Why IRV? Have we not buried
that deep enough? Why not Condorcet which does better
with about the same voting?
In the context that I said I wanted to
Cycles likely are not frequent, but elections with such combinations
of candidates desperately need attention that such as Plurality do not
offer - even if not truly cycle material.
On Apr 18, 2010, at 11:21 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, robert bristow-johnson
On Apr 18, 2010, at 11:21 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
a écrit :
but cycles don't always happen, and i
would bet that they rarely happen in the real world.
[Burlington example]
I actually view this as possibly
Hi Robert,
--- En date de : Dim 18.4.10, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com a écrit :
now i disagree with Gierzynski's value system here, but i
agree with him about the consequences. if the Liberals
in Burlington want to minimize the likelihood of electing
the Conservative
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Dim 18.4.10, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
a écrit :
Why IRV? Have we not buried
that deep enough? Why not Condorcet which
does better
with about the same voting?
In
A comment on Later-No-Harm.
The discussion of voting systems largely ignores what may be the most
widely-used voting system! Certainly, outside of governmental usage,
it's the most widely-used, and that is repeated ballot. As described
in Robert's Rules of Order, voters vote for one
On Apr 18, 2010, at 6:39 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Dim 18.4.10, robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
a écrit :
now i disagree with Gierzynski's value system here, but i
agree with him about the consequences. if the Liberals
in Burlington want to minimize the
Hi,
This post is going to ramble a bit but I thought I'd get something out.
There are no big conclusions; I'm just explaining where I am at in my
mind currently.
Here are classifications of three-candidate scenarios as they exist in
my head:
.'. symmetric - you need a second axis in issue space
Why IRV? Have we not buried that deep enough? Why not Condorcet
which does better with about the same voting?
Why TTR? Shouldn't that be avoided if trying for a good method? TTR
requires smart deciding as to which candidates to vote on.
Will not Condorcet attend to clones with minimum
First, quoting Wikipedia:
A Condorcet method is any single-winner election method that meets
the Condorcet criterion, that is, which always selects the Condorcet
winner, the candidate who would beat each of the other candidates in
a run-off election, if such a candidate exists. In modern
On Apr 17, 2010, at 9:25 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
In my opinion, Condorcet refers to a criterion
rather than to an election method.
actually Markus, i mostly disagree. Condorcet, with no other
qualification (like Schulze or RP) does not *fully* describe a method
because it doesn't
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