Here's a puzzle of party strategy. A continuous open primary (0) ranks all possible candidates by primary votes received. The assembly size is 12, so the predicted election bar (---) is below candidate (Fi). Candidates are divided by known party preference (H, J) and independents (i1). This division yields the default nomination scenario (1). Ah, Bh, Dh and Eh are expected to accept the nomination of the left party, while Bj and Ej accept that of the right. The remainder go to the open party (i1). The open party is apolitical and nominates anyone, but is constrained to list in primary order (0).
(0) | (1) | (2) P | | all | H i1 J | H i1 J --- | --- --- --- | --- --- --- 30 Ah | Ah | Ah 29 Ai | Ai | Ai 14 Bh | Bh | Bh 14 Bi | Bi | Bi 14 Bj | Bj | Bj 13 Ci | Ci | Ci 10 Dh | Dh | Dh 10 Di | Di | Di 9 Eh | Eh | - Eh 8 Ei | Ei | Ei 8 Ej | Ej | Ej 8 Fi | Fi | - --- | --- --- --- | --- --- --- 6 Gh | | Gh 5 Gi | | 4 Hh | | 4 Hi | | 4 Hj | | 4 Li | | --- | --- --- --- | --- --- --- | 63 + 82 + 22 | 60 + 83 + 22 | | | = 167 | = 165 Figure [NB]. Two nomination scenarios. http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/assembly_election/multi-winner#NB Scenario (2) differs in that Eh accepts the nomination of the open party instead of H. But she remains left in orientation, so the left is now predicted to elect 5 instead of 4. This is by assumption P: P: Electors use their votes on election day to elect the seating of PARTIES that was predicted in the primary and the default nomination scenario (0, 1). So H seats 4 regardless of the actual nomination scenario (1, 2 or 3). Suppose the left and right compete in this. Scenario (3) shows both increasing their seat counts by 50%, which is the most they can do. (0) | (3) P | (4) C | | all | H i1 J | H i1 J --- | --- --- --- | --- --- --- 30 Ah | Ah | Ah 29 Ai | Ai | Ai 14 Bh | - Bh | - Bh 14 Bi | Bi | Bi 14 Bj | Bj - | Bj - 13 Ci | Ci | Ci 10 Dh | - Dh | - Dh 10 Di | - | Di 9 Eh | Eh | Eh 8 Ei | - | Ei 8 Ej | Ej | Ej 8 Fi | - | Fi --- | --- --- --- | --- --- --- 6 Gh | Gh | 5 Gi | | 4 Hh | Hh | 4 Hi | | 4 Hj | Hj | 4 Li | | --- | --- --- --- | --- ---- -- | 49 + 94 + 12 | 39 + 120 + 8 | | | = 155 | = 167 Figure [FC]. Two electoral assumptions. http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/assembly_election/multi-winner#NB The same nomination scenario (3) is repeated in (4), but here the electoral assumption is changed from P to C: C: Electors use their votes on election day to elect the seating of CANDIDATES that was predicted in the primary (0). So they follow the candidates into the open party, and Ah to Fi are elected regardless. The truth must be somewhere between P and C (3 and 4); each is true to some extent. They therefore work together to take bites out of the parties: first P attracts the better candidates (or at least gives them political cover to escape the party), while C takes an electoral bite out of the party in consequence. The measure of that bite is the effect on candidate strength (summed at bottom). It's a smaller bite if i1 is small to begin with, but it grows with each election cycle. So what could party H do to avoid being eaten up like this? -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info