Re: [EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-07-01 Thread Chris Benham
Jameson, Sorry to be so tardy in replying.   That is not a bad suggestion; I like both systems. Yours gives less of a motivation for honest rating: In most cases, it makes A100 B99 C0 equivalent to A100 B51 C0. No, mine gives more motivation for honest rating (in the sense that it gives less

[EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-06-26 Thread Chris Benham
Jameson, This Condorcet-Range hybrid you suggest seems to me to inherit a couple of the problems with Range Voting. It fails the Minimal Defense criterion. 49: A100,  B0,  C0 24: B100,  A0,  C0 27: C100,  B80, A0 More than half the voters vote A not above equal-bottom and below B, and yet A

Re: [EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-06-26 Thread Jameson Quinn
This Condorcet-Range hybrid you suggest seems to me to inherit a couple of the problems with Range Voting. Fair enough. It fails the Minimal Defense criterion. 49: A100, B0, C0 24: B100, A0, C0 27: C100, B80, A0 More than half the voters vote A not above equal-bottom and below

[EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-06-25 Thread Jameson Quinn
I believe that using Range ballots, renormalized on the Smith set as a Condorcet tiebreaker, is a very good system by many criteria. I'm of course nothttp://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-January/014469.htmlthe first one to propose this method, but I'd like to

Re: [EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-06-25 Thread Paul Kislanko
...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Jameson Quinn Sent: Thursday, June 25, 2009 12:56 PM To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: [EM] Condorcet/Range DSV I believe that using Range ballots, renormalized on the Smith set as a Condorcet tiebreaker, is a very good system by many criteria. I'm of course

Re: [EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-06-25 Thread Jameson Quinn
2009/6/25 Paul Kislanko kisla...@airmail.net I have a hard time reconciling Note that this could elect a Condorcet loser and It fulfills Condorcet (by definition) . If the first is true, the second cannot be, by, uhhh, definition. No. If there is a Condorcet winner, it elects that person;

Re: [EM] Condorcet/Range DSV

2009-06-25 Thread Jameson Quinn
I left out one good aspect of this system. It is additive - ie, it can be counted locally. You need to keep n(n-1)(n-1)/2 tallies - the Condorcet matrix, plus the result of each candidate renormalized against every other pair of candidates. If there were ever more than 3 candidates in the Smith