--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
I try to summarize my comments in the
form of some rough definitions.
A simple method requires
1) a 'simple' method to convert honest
preferences into optimal votes
A zero-info method
Juho Laatu wrote:
I try to summarize my comments in the
form of some rough definitions.
A simple method requires
1) a 'simple' method to convert honest
preferences into optimal votes
A zero-info method requires
2) this method may not use info about
other voters, but still be able to
convert
On Tue, Jan 20, 2009 at 10:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Perhaps. My point is not this. I explicitly said that I didn't know the zero
info strategy (not sure). But also note that what I'm talking about is
/zero info strategy/, i.e. how you'd vote if you were stuck
--- On Thu, 22/1/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
Anyway maybe a non-manipulable method requires
1) a simple method to convert honest preferences into valid
votes
2) this method may not use info about other voters
3) If everyone else uses this method, then it is in your
interests
OK, Range votes are just votes. But voters
do have also opinions. They can be presented
as ratings.
If the voter casts a vote with the intention
that it reflects her opinions as accurately
as possible, then I'd call that vote sincere
(and in most cases not strategic).
If the voter casts a vote
On Jan 18, 2009, at 5:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
- Why was the first set of definitions
not good enough for Approval? (I read
rank as referring to the sincere
personal opinions, not to the ballot.)
vi ranks, and vi is by
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 18, 2009, at 5:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Jonathan Lundell
jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
- Why was the first set of definitions
not good enough for Approval? (I read
rank as referring to the
At 01:38 AM 1/18/2009, Juho Laatu wrote:
I don't quite see why ranking based
methods (Range, Approval) would not
follow the same principles/definitions
as rating based methods. The sincere
message of the voter was above that she
only slightly prefers B over A but the
strategic vote indicated
At 03:57 PM 1/18/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Wouldn't it be stricter than this? Consider Range, for instance. One
would guess that the best zero info strategy is to vote Approval
style with the cutoff at some point (mean? not sure).
Actually, that's a lousy strategy. The reason it's
Hi,
Manipulability by voter strategy can be rigorously defined without
problematic concepts like preferences or sincere votes or how a dictator
would vote or or how a rational voter would vote given beliefs about
others' votes.
Let X denote the set of alternatives being voted on.
On Jan 17, 2009, at 10:38 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
The mail contained quite good
definitions.
I didn't however agree with the
referenced part below. I think sincere
and
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
The mail contained quite good
definitions.
I didn't however agree with the
referenced part below. I think sincere
and zero-knowledge best strategic
ballot need not be the same. For example
in Range(0,99) my sincere ballot
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 17, 2009, at 10:38 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Jonathan Lundell
jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 17, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
The mail contained quite good
definitions.
I didn't
On Jan 8, 2009, at 4:45 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
The whole concept of strategic voting is flawed when applied to
Range. Voters place vote strength where they think it will do the
most good -- if they think. Some don't. Approval is essentially, as
Brams claimed, strategy-free, in the
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