Hallo,
the Young method calculates for each candidate A
the minimum number of ballots that have to be
removed so that candidate A doesn't lose any
of its pairwise comparisons. The Young method
chooses that candidate for whom this number
is the smallest.
Also the Young method satisfies
Forest wrote:
..MinMax is the only commonly known Condorcet method that satisfies the
following weak form of Participation:
If A wins and then another ballot with A ranked unique first is added to the
count, A still wins.
That is Mono-add-Top, I think coined by Douglas Woodall. It is met by
In his last message Juho gave an example in which MinMax(wv) fails to satisfy
the weak participation criterion that Perez said was satisfied by MinMax. I
looked up Perez' proof, and found that he made essential use of complete
rankings, in which case margins and wv give the same results. Joho's
I don't know if Juho is still cheering for MinMax as a public proposal. I used
to be against it because of its clone dependence, but now that I realize that
measuring defeat strength by AWP (Approval Weighted Pairwise) solves that
problem, I'm starting to warm up more to the idea.
MinMax
I still include minmax(margins) in the set of good Condorcet methods,
also for practical elections. AWP style defeat strength measuring is a
very interesting addition to the Condorcet family. It may be a bit
tedious to the voters but in principle very interesting as said. Also
variants of
