One kind of SODA strategy which I didn't discuss is candidate
preference-declaration strategy aimed, not at directly attaining a better
result, but at attracting votes. This would basically take two forms:
established candidates truncating upstarts to try to minimize their
importance, and a candida
2011/12/15 Andrew Myers
> On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
>
>> I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have
>> reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to
>> delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just don't
>> have a
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
I don't see any huge theoretical downsides. Do others still have
reservations about SODA? I realize that some people may be opposed to
delegation, in principle. And others think delegable systems just
don't have a chance of getting implemented. So I
Like Andy I prefer SODA as well, especially for a deterministic method. In
some settings I prefer certain
stochastic methods to deterministic methods. But my curiosity impels me to see
what can be done
while ignoring or putting aside the advantages of both chance and delegation.
Election
Further responses to Andy's advantage list:
2011/12/14 Andy Jennings
> Jameson,
>
> Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than
> LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure.
>
> In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are:
>
> 1. The lazi
Thanks, Andy, for the SODA endorsement. I agree with the advantages you
list, but I would add the avoidance of the chicken dilemma (that is, the
lack of either a self-reinforcing truncation incentive or hard-to-defend
"mindreading"results that give a burial incentive) as an important
advantage. Com
Jameson,
Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than
LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure.
In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are:
1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is
still casting a (nearl
I believe that LRV (Least Resentment Voting) is indeed quite a clever
solution to the chicken dilemma. But once more, I'd like to remind people
that there is a way to solve the chicken dilemma without risking a victory
by the plurality winner/condorcet loser. I'm speaking of course of SODA.
First,
