Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-24 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Dave Ketchum wrote: On Fri, 23 Jan 2009 12:47:53 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there w

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-23 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Fri, 23 Jan 2009 12:47:53 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will be only two, why

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-23 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 06:47 AM 1/23/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I'll say again: if there are more than two viable parties, the this could happen. If there will be only two viable parties, why use Approval? You've missed something crucial: Approval is being proposed for public partisan elections where th

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-23 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will be only two, why have Approval in the first place?). You support A > B > C. If A i

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-22 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will be only two, why have Approval in the first place?). You support A > B > C. If A is in the lead, you can appro

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-21 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Dave Ketchum wrote: Here it is noted that IRV has a black mark for failing to correctly award W as deserving winner. They seem not to notice that IRV's failure is also describable as incorrectly discarding W as an undeserving loser. As to escaping two party domination, think on: Plurality:

[EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-20 Thread Dave Ketchum
Here it is noted that IRV has a black mark for failing to correctly award W as deserving winner. They seem not to notice that IRV's failure is also describable as incorrectly discarding W as an undeserving loser. As to escaping two party domination, think on: Plurality: If I prefer one of th