Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sat.Nov.29):
-snip-
I don't know of any method that meets the MDQBR you refer to that isn't
completely invulnerable to Burial (do you?), so I don't see how that criterion
is
presently useful.
That's odd, because the example I gave in a reply to Juho was yours.
Kristofer,
You wrote addressing me:
You have some examples showing that RP/Schulze/etc fail the criterion.
By my lazy etc. I just meant 'and the other Condorcet methods that are
all equivalent to MinMax when there are just 3 candidates and Smith//Minmax
when there are not more than 3 candidates
Chris Benham wrote:
Regarding my proposed Unmanipulable Majority criterion:
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than half the ballots, then it must
Regarding my proposed Unmanipulable Majority criterion:
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than half the ballots, then it must not be possible to make
At 01:21 PM 11/26/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
Unmanipulable Majority.
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted
I propose to amend my suggested Unmanipulable Majority
criterion by simply adding a phrase beginning with without..
so that it now reads:
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins
Kristofer,
...your Dominant Mutual Quarter Burial Resistance property.
I don't remember reading or hearing about anything like that with Quarter in
the title
anywhere except in your EM posts.
A few years ago James Green-Armytage coined the Mutual Dominant Third
criterion
but never
I think you have alot of redundant language, is the criterion
effectively the following?
If the winner is preferred to another candidate on the majority of the
ballots, it must not be possible to make any such candidate win by
modifying the ballots where that candidate is preferred to the winner.
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
Unmanipulable Majority.
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer,
Thanks for at least responding.
...I won't say anything about the desirability because I don't know
what it implies;..
Only judging criteria by how they fit in with other criteria is
obviously circular.
That's true. If we're going to judge criteria by
Chris Benham wrote:
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
Unmanipulable Majority.
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
Unmanipulable Majority.
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than half the ballots, then
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