On Apr 7, 2008, at 21:01 , Chris Benham wrote:
Now say we add three ballots that plump for C.
31: AB
32: BC
36: C (were 33:C)
04: AC
Now the winner changes from C back to B (C leads, AB compromises, B
leads
and wins), a failure of Mono-add-Plump.
AC voters can still compromise
Juho wrote:
I presented only some positive examples. Also various bad failure
cases would be appreciated if you can find good examples.
Juho,
31: AB
32: BC
37: C
C is clearly the strongest candidate, having both more first preferences
and more second preferences than either of the other
Here's one new method (as far as I know, tell if you have seen this
before) for your consideration.
One viewpoint to this method is that it tries to make the sequential
process of IRV better than what it is in the basic IRV. On the other
hand this can be seen also as an Approval method
