Hello,
I've been thinking about 3-slot methods that combine
Top Ratings, Approval and Pairwise Opposition
information (all concepts that are compatible with FBC
and Independence from Irrelevant Ballots) to produce a
method that meets those criteria and also 3-slot
Majority for Solid Coalitions
Chris,
--- Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
As far as my strategy simulation is concerned, this rule change raises
the
question of how voters should evaluate the possibility that they elevate
a
candidate to the top spot on first preferences only to
Kevin,
I just realised that my suggested IIB-fix of MCA does cost a criterion
compliance:
Later-no-Help. Adding middle-ratings can help top-rated candidates by
maybe
increasing the Max Pairwise Opposition of their rivals.
I consider having LNHelp and LNHarm in (at least probabilistic)