On Apr 22, 2008, at 7:12 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
If the method fails (picks a bad winner) when the field
can't be narrowed to three viable candidates in time for the
election, or
when the candidates can't be interpreted to fit on a 1D spectrum,
I'd say
that's ok. The first problem is
Hi,
--- Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On Apr 17, 2008, at 16:39 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
The claim that I don't recall having seen before is that in
Range and
Approval it makes sense to the parties not to nominate multiple
candidates.
I've made this claim as well. When
On Apr 17, 2008, at 16:39 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
The claim that I don't recall having seen before is that in
Range and
Approval it makes sense to the parties not to nominate multiple
candidates.
I've made this claim as well. When we're lucky enough to have three
viable
candidates
On Apr 18, 2008, at 21:56 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
The claim that advanced election methods, starting with IRV, will
reduce negative campaigning is pure fluff
I agree that this is mostly a problem of its own, not that much
linked to the used vote counting procedures.
There are
Hi,
The claim that I don't recall having seen before is that in Range and
Approval it makes sense to the parties not to nominate multiple
candidates.
I've made this claim as well. When we're lucky enough to have three viable
candidates I tend to assume that either the center is running as
I choose to ignore Approval and Range Voting, to concentrate on Condorcet.
On Mon, 14 Apr 2008 06:50:34 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
...
Juho also made a point about whether a similar problem might exist given
ranked ballot voting methods. Voters could have trouble ranking all
their
It was pointed out to me that this is actually the Burr dilemma. I
should have remembered this example. Just coming to the same
conclusions using a different route. I guess the conclusions are
valid, and in addition to Approval and Range there are some
implications also on the ranked
Hi,
I've been making the claims Juho described below, that enough spoiling
potential exists in Approval and Range Voting to deter parties from
nominating more than one candidate, periodically for several years in
this maillist, beginning with Approval. The problem, as I see it, is
that many
Let's assume that the set of candidates consists of groups of clones.
For example there can be multiple parties and each of these parties
has multiple candidates. We further assume that typical voter
preferences are such that they prefer all their own party candidates
clearly over the
