Hello, I was thinking of building a free public web service, perhaps
operated by a charitable NPO, that would allow organizations (including
perhaps small governments) to operate online elections in a way that offers
some sophisticated modern security features.
In addition to taking standard
To put a different slant on James Gilmour's message bout fraud vs. wasted
votes under plurality voting...
I'm sure Kathy Dopp (on this list for a few months now) will note that
high level fraud is possible without detection on current voting
technology, which is why systems should be
Kathy Dopp wrote:
In fact there has never been even a theoretical design for an
electronic voting system or even electronic paper ballot vote counting
system that does not have known security leaks.
In my design, whether or not there are security holes in the vote-counting
system itself, the
Just for the record -
Raph Frank Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2008 11:27 PM
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 12:00 PM, James Gilmour
Here in Scotland there is a somewhat hidden debate that must be had.
STV-PR was introduced for local government elections in 2007. The
counting rules adopted
THANK YOU, Terry James.
Plurality does fine with two candidates, or with one obvious winner over
others. It is unable, even with top-two Runoffs, to satisfy voter needs to
identify:
Best - hoped for winner.
Next - hoped for if best loses.
Remainder - not as good as above.
On Sat, 4 Oct 2008 01:56:01 -0400 Michael Allan wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in
tailoring test cases to favor a desired result.
Maybe try an open simulator. Make the electorate engine pluggable
so experimenters can try
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 18:24:09 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More complete defenses are possible with electronics.
Totally FALSE statement.
Sad that we cannot look at the same reality!
Conceded that rogue programmers can do all
