Paul Kislanko wrote:
This still makes no sense to me, since C has no more a majority in case 2
than it had in case 1.
If mutual majority selects (A B) in case 1 and (A B C) in case 2, it makes
no sense at all and should never be mentioned again.
Mutual majority can still be useful. Let's
This is the post that confused me, and got everbody yelling at me because I
was confused. I call attention to theis bit:
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
--
My
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Paul Kislanko kisla...@airmail.net wrote:
Arrr. Explain, someone, anyone, how MM can change an (A
B) to an (A B C)
possible winner set by adding voters for A.
One way to say this is that since in the
first example there was a set of voters
(26 AB, 25 BA) that had a
Hi Paul,
Regarding mutual majority:
The problem is that the BA voters cannot be counted as solidly committed
to {A}. They can only be counted to {B} and {A,B}. The additional A
bullet voters can only be counted to {A}. C was excluded in scenario 1
because {A,B} possessed a majority. The new A
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
Here words Now Mutual Majority elects
{A,B,C} are a bit confusing since mutual
majority doesn't set any requirements on
who should be elected (nor elect anyone).
...
Kevin,
You wrote (10 Jan 2009):
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
Oops! (I knew that!) Sorry for falsely contradicting you.
Why is mono-add-plump important?
Because as an election method
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Let's consider the first election first, with
truncation extended to full preference:
26: A B C
25: B A C
49: C A = B
A B C: 100 prefer {A B C} to the empty set
This case is
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Sun, 11/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Let's consider the first election first, with
truncation extended to full preference:
26: A B C
25: B A C
49:
Here's one comment. The topmost thoughts in
my mind when thinking about this approach
is that 1) the principles are good and 2)
making the votes public limits the usability
of the method. Traditionally secret votes
have been a building block of democracies.
Public votes work somewhere but not
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
If there is a set of voters that form a
majority and they all prefer all candidates
of set A to all candidates of set B then
candidates of set B should not win.
This helps A (as requested) by at least
Ok, that relaxed version of mutual majority degraded faster to basic majority
than I expected. Need to think more if there is something to conclude from the
BA votes.
Juho
--- On Mon, 12/1/09, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
Subject: Re: [EM]
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Dim 11.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
Kevin,
You wrote (10 Jan 2009):
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
Mutual Majority elects {A,B}
Now add 5 A bullet votes:
26 AB
25 BA
49 C
5 A
Now Mutual Majority elects {A,B,C}.
Oops! (I knew that!)
Juho Laatu wrote:
... The topmost thoughts in my mind when thinking about this
approach is that 1) the principles are good and 2) making the votes
public limits the usability of the method. Traditionally secret
votes have been a building block of democracies. Public votes work
somewhere but
Kevin,
You wrote (11 Jan 2009):
There are reasons for criteria to be important other than how easy they are
to satisfy.
Otherwise why would we ever bother to satisfy the difficult criteria?
Well, if as I said none of the criteria were incompatible with each other
then
presumably none of the
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