I've been meaning to show this, but I haven't tested and implemented it
yet. Still, perhaps it would give good results.
The method is as follows. First, determine ranked votes' solid
coalitions, as in DSC and DAC. Then determine the divisor d. Each
coalition deserves the minimum of the number
Raph Frank Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 6:33 PM
Also, I think later no harm basically means won't
compromise. I am not sure that it is even a desirable
criterion for a method to have and think that the fact that a
method that doesn't meet later no harm is a not major issue.
I don't
2009/5/1 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk:
One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for strategic
voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in
some
order other than the sincere 'first to last' order of preference because the
voter knows that some feature of
On May 1, 2009, at 6:02 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
2009/5/1 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk:
One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for
strategic voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in
some
order other than the sincere 'first to last' order of preference
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 3:56 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
The strategy is effectively identical in both versions, despite the
difference in form. That is, in both your mechanisms it seems apparent on
the face of it that a voter would not have a motivation, strategic or
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On May 1, 2009, at 6:02 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
2009/5/1 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk:
One problem with abandoning LNH is that it opens the way for
strategic voting, that is, when a voter ranks the candidates in
some
order other than the sincere 'first to
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 6:53 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
If there are two seats and the left and right factions are of equal
size, and both have respective centrists, the outcome should have a left
centrist (which is close to the median voter of the left faction) and
Raph Frank wrote:
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 6:53 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
If there are two seats and the left and right factions are of equal
size, and both have respective centrists, the outcome should have a left
centrist (which is close to the median voter of the
On Fri, May 1, 2009 at 8:27 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
The problem in using any other method than Plurality for counting the votes
in an STV method is that of elimination. If someone votes for A with
strength 1 and B with strength 0.5, and A wins, then how much do
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The problem in using any other method than Plurality for counting the
votes in an STV method is that of elimination. If someone votes for A
with strength 1 and B with strength 0.5, and A wins, then how much do
you downweight that voter? The A voters should be
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