Here's one simple approach.
- all voters rank all the rooms
- use Borda like personal utility values = last room = 0 points, one
but last = 1 point etc. (also other than this kind of linear scale
could be used)
- find the room allocation that gives the highest sum of utilities
- if there is
Would we agree that voting methods do best when voters give their sincere
rankings to avoid GIGO distortion? Since all voting methods can be subject to
strategic voting strategies with incomplete, exaggerated or insincere ballot
information, might it not be a good idea to select two or more
Something like a CTT auction could be used here.
Each bidder submits a sealed ballot containing the dollar value of each office.
For all possible permutations work out the sum of all the bids.
Assign the offices to the arrangement that gives the highest sum.
For each bidder,
- determine the
Raph Frank Sent: Monday, January 25, 2010 2:17 PM
Something like a CTT auction could be used here.
Each bidder submits a sealed ballot containing the dollar
value of each office.
For all possible permutations work out the sum of all the bids.
Assign the offices to the arrangement
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 09:07:21 -0500
From: Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
Would we agree that voting methods do best when voters give their sincere
rankings to avoid GIGO distortion? Since all voting methods can be subject to
strategic voting strategies with incomplete,
At 05:59 AM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
Here's one simple approach.
- all voters rank all the rooms
- use Borda like personal utility values = last room = 0 points,
one but last = 1 point etc. (also other than this kind of linear
scale could be used)
- find the room allocation that gives the
I reply to myself since I want to present one possible simple method
that combines Condorcet and added weight to first preferences
(something that IRV offers in its own peculiar way).
Let's add an approval cutoff in the Condorcet ballots. The first
approach could be to accept only winners
At 03:13 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
Sure. But equal ranking must be allowed, otherwise noise is
introduced. Borda with equal ranking (and therefore empty ranks,
otherwise equal ranked votes are reduced in strength) is Range. Why
not just use Range, allowing greater precision. One could use a
The advantage of proxy systems such as Asset Voting is that they scale well
to a large number of candidates or voting options. An individual voter need
not study all possibilities; the proxy holder acts as their trusted
representative in that sense. Yet this same advantage can be seen as a
Here is an executive summary kindly suggested by Jameson Quinn:
In his response, Terrill Bouricius argues that the Burlington 2009
IRV result was probably superior to plurality, though, in fact, the
plurality method in prior use there required a 40% plurality and
would likely have produced
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and confusion
and not add anything essential. = Careful consideration needed.
Only a voting systems theorist who is not a parliamentarian or
Juho wrote (25 Jan 2010):
I reply to myself since I want to present one possible simple method
that combines Condorcet and added weight to first preferences
(something that IRV offers in its own peculiar way).
Let's add an approval cutoff in the Condorcet ballots. The first
approach could
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