Terry Bouricius wrote:
Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS,
but as a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow
citizens (or party members, members of an ethnic group, or
whatever). Analysis that focuses on the choices of individuals can
miss the
A summary of my comments (I sent them a ton of email but this just
summarizes the most important points) can be read here:
http://groups.google.com/group/electionsciencefoundation/browse_thread/thread/686c1a4fc3793048
which is thread #945 at the ESF
This GT method is non-monotonic, which is why we didn't pursue it a few years
ago when Jobst reported
on the Condorcet Lottery that was based on the pairwise win matrix (i.e.
Copeland matrix) in the same
way that GT is based on the margins matrix.
Election-Methods mailing list - see
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Friday, April 16, 2010 10:14 am
Subject: Re: [EM] How close can we get to the IIAC
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Schulze's CSSD (Beatpath) method does not satisfy the
Hallo,
Here's a method I proposed a while back that is monotone,
clone free, always elects a candidate from the uncovered
set, and is independent from candidates that beat the
winner, i.e. if a candidate that pairwise beats the
winner is removed, the winner still wins:
1. List the
Hallo,
Here's a method I proposed a while back that is monotone,
clone free, always elects a candidate from the uncovered
set, and is independent from candidates that beat the
winner, i.e. if a candidate that pairwise beats the
winner is removed, the winner still wins:
1. List the
Dear Forest:
check
http://www.rangevoting.org/DhillonM.html
I was never really able to fully understand this paper.
You, having more motivation and/or ability, might be able+wanting to.
Then you can explain it to us all.
(Note, the paper pdf is linked to the bottom of that web page, so
you do
Hi,
This post is going to ramble a bit but I thought I'd get something out.
There are no big conclusions; I'm just explaining where I am at in my
mind currently.
Here are classifications of three-candidate scenarios as they exist in
my head:
.'. symmetric - you need a second axis in issue space
This is getting too deep in some ways. I buy Terry's collective and
think of the rope in a tug of war. We had an election in my village
last month.
We do Plurality and have local parties (involving national parties
would distract from considering local issues - also, few consider
Why IRV? Have we not buried that deep enough? Why not Condorcet
which does better with about the same voting?
Why TTR? Shouldn't that be avoided if trying for a good method? TTR
requires smart deciding as to which candidates to vote on.
Will not Condorcet attend to clones with minimum
First, quoting Wikipedia:
A Condorcet method is any single-winner election method that meets
the Condorcet criterion, that is, which always selects the Condorcet
winner, the candidate who would beat each of the other candidates in
a run-off election, if such a candidate exists. In modern
On Apr 17, 2010, at 9:25 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
In my opinion, Condorcet refers to a criterion
rather than to an election method.
actually Markus, i mostly disagree. Condorcet, with no other
qualification (like Schulze or RP) does not *fully* describe a method
because it doesn't
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