Hallo,
the Young method calculates for each candidate A
the minimum number of ballots that have to be
removed so that candidate A doesn't lose any
of its pairwise comparisons. The Young method
chooses that candidate for whom this number
is the smallest.
Also the Young method satisfies
I met someone from Germany today that mentioned that Germany's
electoral method (to elect its national legislature) is nonmonotonic
because of some interplay between two electoral methods it uses. (at
least that's what I understood, this conversation was in a noisy
bar/restaurant).
Can anyone
... There can be no useful relation between a model that assumes a
maximum of purposive rationality and a reality that demonstrates
none. No voter ever attempts to improve her standing in the
electoral game, because no single vote ever affects the outcome
of a typical election.
Warren
Details of the Enhanced MinMax(AWP) procedure:
First form the matrix M whose entry M(x,y) in row x and column y is one if
alternative x pairwise beats y, is zero if y beats x, and is 1/2 if x and y are
tied and the tie cannot be broken by approval scores. In particular each
diagonal entry of M
You for instance, Warren. You are not deluded.
There's a difference between realizing your own cognitive biases, and
wanting to overcome them. And there's another difference between wanting and
actually overcoming them. Just ask any addict.
JQ
Election-Methods mailing list - see
If I am not mistaken, both Bucklin and MMPO satisfy Perez' weak version of
Participation: if the winner changes when a ballot is added, then the old winner
was not ranked top on the added ballot.
I wonder if some kind of hybrid between these two methods might be better than
either without losing
Hallo,
Bucklin violates mono-add-top. See:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012752.html
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
The other thing I wanted to mention about why Bucklin and MMPO might complement
each other is that MMPO potentially makes more use of the information in the
lower ranks than Bucklin (especially in a many level cardinal weighted pairwise
version), while MMPO tends to encourage equal ranking at
Markus pointed out that Bucklin fails mono add top. Now I see why. If x is
ranked second on all of the ballots except the new one, and some other candidate
y has exactly 50% first place support, then one ballot of the form xy will
change the Bucklin winner from x to y, because now the collapse
I want to thank Markus for keeping me from going too far off track. And the
link he gave below to a great
message of Chris Benham was valuable for more than showing us that Bucklin
violates mono-add-top:
Chris also pointed out that WMA (weighted median approval) does satisfy
Participation.
At 02:28 PM 4/24/2010, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Bucklin violates mono-add-top. See:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012752.html
The criteria failures of Bucklin don't apply to all Bucklin methods.
Woodall's definition of mono-add-top:
At 03:06 PM 4/24/2010, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Markus pointed out that Bucklin fails mono add top. Now I see why. If x is
ranked second on all of the ballots except the new one, and some
other candidate
y has exactly 50% first place support, then one ballot of the form xy will
change the
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Sam 24.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
This is what is common with the
use of voting systems criteria to study methods. Scenarios
are created, sometimes cleverly, to cause a failure of a
criterion. Does it matter if those conditions never
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