I. BDR or "Bucklin Done Right:"
>
>Use 4 levels, say, zero through three. First eliminate all candidates
>defeated
>pairwise with a defeat ratio of 3 to 1. Then collapse the top two levels, and
>eliminate all candidates that suffer a defeat ratio of 2 to 1. If any
>candidates are left, among these elect the one with the greatest number of
>positive ratings.
>
>
><snip>
This seems to be even more Approvalish than normal Bucklin.
65: A3, B2
35: B3, A0
(I assume that zero indicates least preferred)
Forest's "BDR" method elects A, failing Majority Favourite.
In response to the above, Abd Lomax-Smith wrote (3 June 2010):
<snip>
Now, who would use BDR with only two candidates? It's like using
>Range with only two candidates. Why would you care about "majority
>favorite" if you decide to use raw range. I wonder why the A faction
>even bothered to vote with that pattern of utilities ("ratings").
>That's what is completely unrealistic about this kind of analysis.
><snip>
I was content to simply prove that the method simply fails Majority Favourite,
but to appease
Abd here is a similar example with three candidates:
60: A3, B1, C0
35: B3, A0, C1
05: C3, A2, C0
A is the big majority favourite and the big voted "raw range" winner, and yet
B wins.
Chris Benham
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