[EM] SODA rationale, part 1 of 4: Undecided voters (was: Record activity on the EM list?)

but, as a peripheral actor here, i haven't been participating too much in this SODA thing or any other asset voting systems. i have to admit that my attitude toward such is why bother?. i still don't get it. maybe in an election in an organization or corporation, but i just can't see such

Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?

2011/8/3 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side. Earlier I have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner methods. Now there are still some interesting but unread mails in my inbox. Multi-winner methods are, if

Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?

Hi Jameson, I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the slates to think about the best composition of the council and not about their candidates. This encourages deliberation and discussion across partisan borders, I imagine, in order to find the perfect mix. Slate

Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?

2011/8/3 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Hi Jameson, I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the slates to think about the best composition of the council and not about their candidates. This encourages deliberation and discussion across partisan borders, I

Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?

Juho Laatu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than single-winner methods. I disagree. It is much easier to obtain a satisfactory (representative, acceptable) outcome for a multi-winner election than it is to obtain a

Re: [EM] Amalgamation details, hijacking, and free-riding

So if the true preferences are 20 AB 45 C? 35 (something else), the C supporters could spare 21 voters to vote AC so that the amalgamated factions would become 41 AC 24 C? 35 (something else) . I can see where it is possible for such a move to payoff, but it seems fairly innocuos compared

Re: [EM] Amalgamation details, hijacking, and free-riding

2011/8/3 fsimm...@pcc.edu So if the true preferences are 20 AB 45 C? 35 (something else), the C supporters could spare 21 voters to vote AC so that the amalgamated factions would become 41 AC 24 C? 35 (something else) . I can see where it is possible for such a move to payoff,

Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?

This method looks like one pretty natural way of measuring who should be elected. The privacy concerns are a problem in some environments but not all. This method could thus well suit for some real-world use (if privacy in not a problem or if voting machines or vote counters can be trusted).